[U-Boot] [PATCH v3 2/2] image: Protect against overflow in unknown_msg()

[Tom Rini]

On Thu, Oct 27, 2016 at 08:18:39PM -0600, Simon Glass wrote:
> Coverity complains that this can overflow. If we later increase the size
> of one of the strings in the table, it could happen.
> 
> Adjust the code to protect against this.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg at chromium.org>
> Reported-by: Coverity (CID: 150964)
> ---
> 
> Changes in v3:
> - Adjust to deal with what strncpy() actually does (I think)
> 
> Changes in v2:
> - Drop unwanted #include
> 
>  common/image.c | 6 ++++--
>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/common/image.c b/common/image.c
> index 0e86c13..016f263 100644
> --- a/common/image.c
> +++ b/common/image.c
> @@ -588,9 +588,11 @@ const table_entry_t *get_table_entry(const table_entry_t *table, int id)
>  static const char *unknown_msg(enum ih_category category)
>  {
>  	static char msg[30];
> +	static char unknown_str = "Unknown ";
>  
> -	strcpy(msg, "Unknown ");
> -	strcat(msg, table_info[category].desc);
> +	strcpy(msg, unknown_str);
> +	strncat(msg, table_info[category].desc,
> +		sizeof(msg) - sizeof(unknown_str));

We still need to subtract 1 more here at the end, for the NUL don't we?

-- 
Tom
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