[U-Boot] [PATCH v5] xilinx: zynq: Add support to secure images

Michal Simek monstr at monstr.eu
Wed Jun 27 14:48:20 UTC 2018


On 27.6.2018 16:33, Michal Simek wrote:
> On 26.6.2018 11:32, Siva Durga Prasad Paladugu wrote:
>> This patch basically adds two new commands for loadig secure
>> images.
>> 1. zynq rsa adds support to load secure image which can be both
>>    authenticated or encrypted or both authenticated and encrypted
>>    image in xilinx bootimage(BOOT.bin) format.
>> 2. zynq aes command adds support to decrypt and load encrypted
>>    image back to DDR as per destination address. The image has
>>    to be encrypted using xilinx bootgen tool and to get only the
>>    encrypted image from tool use -split option while invoking
>>    bootgen.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Siva Durga Prasad Paladugu <siva.durga.paladugu at xilinx.com>
>> ---
>> Changes from v4:
>> - Moved license to top of file as per comment
>> - Removed unused variable ppkexp
>> - Used void * for buf, added check for buf allocation and freeing buf
>> - Fixed coding style comments and fsbl_len usage
>>
>> Changes from v3:
>> - Removed aesload and aesloadp as encrypted bitstream load
>>   is under duscussion and hence removed from this patch. Will
>>   work on it as a separate patch once discussion finalized.
>> _ Fixed coding style comments
>>
>> Changes from v2:
>> - Created separate commands for zynq aesload and aesloadp
>>   as per comment
>> - Fixed all other coding style comments
>>
>> Changes from v1:
>> - Defined two config synbols for RSA and AES separately
>>   and used them wherever required.
>> - Used U_BOOT_CMD_KENT as per comment
>> - Cleared DEVCFG_CTRL_PCAP_RATE_EN_MASK once decryption is
>>   done.
>>
>> Changes from RFC:
>> - Moved zynqaes to board/xilinx/zynq/cmds.c and renamed as
>>   "zynq aes".
>> - Moved boot image parsing code to a separate file.
>> - Squashed in to a single patch.
>> - Fixed coding style comments.
>> ---
>>  arch/arm/Kconfig                           |   1 +
>>  arch/arm/mach-zynq/include/mach/hardware.h |   1 +
>>  board/xilinx/zynq/Kconfig                  |  33 ++
>>  board/xilinx/zynq/Makefile                 |   5 +
>>  board/xilinx/zynq/bootimg.c                | 143 ++++++++
>>  board/xilinx/zynq/cmds.c                   | 513 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>  drivers/fpga/zynqpl.c                      |  45 +++
>>  include/u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h               |   4 +
>>  include/zynq_bootimg.h                     |  33 ++
>>  include/zynqpl.h                           |   4 +
>>  lib/rsa/rsa-mod-exp.c                      |  51 +++
>>  11 files changed, 833 insertions(+)
>>  create mode 100644 board/xilinx/zynq/Kconfig
>>  create mode 100644 board/xilinx/zynq/bootimg.c
>>  create mode 100644 board/xilinx/zynq/cmds.c
>>  create mode 100644 include/zynq_bootimg.h
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig
>> index 3e05f79..e78e1a4 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm/Kconfig
>> +++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig
>> @@ -1428,6 +1428,7 @@ source "board/toradex/colibri_pxa270/Kconfig"
>>  source "board/vscom/baltos/Kconfig"
>>  source "board/woodburn/Kconfig"
>>  source "board/work-microwave/work_92105/Kconfig"
>> +source "board/xilinx/zynq/Kconfig"
>>  source "board/xilinx/zynqmp/Kconfig"
>>  source "board/zipitz2/Kconfig"
>>  
>> diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-zynq/include/mach/hardware.h b/arch/arm/mach-zynq/include/mach/hardware.h
>> index f69cf00..3ff3c10 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm/mach-zynq/include/mach/hardware.h
>> +++ b/arch/arm/mach-zynq/include/mach/hardware.h
>> @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
>>  #define ZYNQ_EFUSE_BASEADDR		0xF800D000
>>  #define ZYNQ_USB_BASEADDR0		0xE0002000
>>  #define ZYNQ_USB_BASEADDR1		0xE0003000
>> +#define ZYNQ_OCM_BASEADDR		0xFFFC0000
>>  
>>  /* Bootmode setting values */
>>  #define ZYNQ_BM_MASK		0x7
>> diff --git a/board/xilinx/zynq/Kconfig b/board/xilinx/zynq/Kconfig
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 0000000..196c8e2
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/board/xilinx/zynq/Kconfig
>> @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
>> +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
>> +#
>> +# Copyright (c) 2018, Xilinx, Inc.
>> +
>> +if ARCH_ZYNQ
>> +
>> +config CMD_ZYNQ
>> +	bool "Enable Zynq specific commands"
>> +	default y
>> +	help
>> +	  Enables Zynq specific commands.
>> +
>> +config CMD_ZYNQ_AES
>> +	bool "Enable zynq aes command for decryption of encrypted images"
>> +	depends on CMD_ZYNQ
>> +	depends on FPGA_ZYNQPL
>> +	help
>> +	  Decrypts the encrypted image present in source address
>> +	  and places the decrypted image at destination address.
>> +
>> +config CMD_ZYNQ_RSA
>> +	bool "Enable zynq rsa command for loading secure images"
>> +	default y
>> +	depends on CMD_ZYNQ
>> +	select CMD_ZYNQ_AES
>> +	help
>> +	  Enabling this will support zynq secure image verification.
>> +	  The secure image is a xilinx specific BOOT.BIN with
>> +	  either authentication or encryption or both encryption
>> +	  and authentication feature enabled while generating
>> +	  BOOT.BIN using Xilinx bootgen tool.
>> +
>> +endif
>> diff --git a/board/xilinx/zynq/Makefile b/board/xilinx/zynq/Makefile
>> index 5a76a26..f4996fa 100644
>> --- a/board/xilinx/zynq/Makefile
>> +++ b/board/xilinx/zynq/Makefile
>> @@ -18,6 +18,11 @@ $(warning Put custom ps7_init_gpl.c/h to board/xilinx/zynq/custom_hw_platform/))
>>  endif
>>  endif
>>  
>> +ifndef CONFIG_SPL_BUILD
>> +obj-$(CONFIG_CMD_ZYNQ) += cmds.o
>> +obj-$(CONFIG_CMD_ZYNQ_RSA) += bootimg.o
>> +endif
>> +
>>  obj-$(CONFIG_SPL_BUILD) += $(init-objs)
>>  
>>  # Suppress "warning: function declaration isn't a prototype"
>> diff --git a/board/xilinx/zynq/bootimg.c b/board/xilinx/zynq/bootimg.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 0000000..56d69cd
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/board/xilinx/zynq/bootimg.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
>> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
>> +/*
>> + * Copyright (C) 2018 Xilinx, Inc.
>> + */
>> +
>> +#include <common.h>
>> +#include <asm/io.h>
>> +#include <asm/arch/hardware.h>
>> +#include <asm/arch/sys_proto.h>
>> +#include <u-boot/md5.h>
>> +#include <zynq_bootimg.h>
>> +
>> +DECLARE_GLOBAL_DATA_PTR;
>> +
>> +#define ZYNQ_IMAGE_PHDR_OFFSET		0x09C
>> +#define ZYNQ_IMAGE_FSBL_LEN_OFFSET	0x040
>> +#define ZYNQ_PART_HDR_CHKSUM_WORD_COUNT	0x0F
>> +#define ZYNQ_PART_HDR_WORD_COUNT	0x10
>> +#define ZYNQ_MAXIMUM_IMAGE_WORD_LEN	0x40000000
>> +#define MD5_CHECKSUM_SIZE	16
>> +
>> +struct headerarray {
>> +	u32 fields[16];
>> +};
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Check whether the given partition is last partition or not
>> + */
>> +static int zynq_islastpartition(struct headerarray *head)
>> +{
>> +	int index;
>> +
>> +	debug("%s\n", __func__);
>> +	if (head->fields[ZYNQ_PART_HDR_CHKSUM_WORD_COUNT] != 0xFFFFFFFF)
>> +		return -1;
>> +
>> +	for (index = 0; index < ZYNQ_PART_HDR_WORD_COUNT - 1; index++) {
>> +		if (head->fields[index] != 0x0)
>> +			return -1;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Get the partition count from the partition header
>> + */
>> +int zynq_get_part_count(struct partition_hdr *part_hdr_info)
>> +{
>> +	u32 count;
>> +	struct headerarray *hap;
>> +
>> +	debug("%s\n", __func__);
>> +
>> +	for (count = 0; count < ZYNQ_MAX_PARTITION_NUMBER; count++) {
>> +		hap = (struct headerarray *)&part_hdr_info[count];
>> +		if (zynq_islastpartition(hap) != -1)
>> +			break;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	return count;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Get the partition info of all the partitions available.
>> + */
>> +int zynq_get_partition_info(u32 image_base_addr, u32 *fsbl_len,
>> +			    struct partition_hdr *part_hdr)
>> +{
>> +	u32 parthdroffset;
>> +
>> +	*fsbl_len = *((u32 *)(image_base_addr + ZYNQ_IMAGE_FSBL_LEN_OFFSET));
>> +
>> +	parthdroffset = *((u32 *)(image_base_addr + ZYNQ_IMAGE_PHDR_OFFSET));
>> +
>> +	parthdroffset += image_base_addr;
>> +
>> +	memcpy(part_hdr, (u32 *)parthdroffset,
>> +	       (sizeof(struct partition_hdr) * ZYNQ_MAX_PARTITION_NUMBER));
>> +
>> +	return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Check whether the partition header is valid or not
>> + */
>> +int zynq_validate_hdr(struct partition_hdr *header)
>> +{
>> +	struct headerarray *hap;
>> +	u32 index;
>> +	u32 checksum;
>> +
>> +	debug("%s\n", __func__);
>> +
>> +	hap = (struct headerarray *)header;
>> +
>> +	for (index = 0; index < ZYNQ_PART_HDR_WORD_COUNT; index++) {
>> +		if (hap->fields[index])
>> +			break;
>> +	}
>> +	if (index == ZYNQ_PART_HDR_WORD_COUNT)
>> +		return -1;
>> +
>> +	checksum = 0;
>> +	for (index = 0; index < ZYNQ_PART_HDR_CHKSUM_WORD_COUNT; index++)
>> +		checksum += hap->fields[index];
>> +
>> +	checksum ^= 0xFFFFFFFF;
>> +
>> +	if (hap->fields[ZYNQ_PART_HDR_CHKSUM_WORD_COUNT] != checksum) {
>> +		printf("Error: Checksum 0x%8.8x != 0x%8.8x\n",
>> +		       checksum, hap->fields[ZYNQ_PART_HDR_CHKSUM_WORD_COUNT]);
>> +		return -1;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	if (header->imagewordlen > ZYNQ_MAXIMUM_IMAGE_WORD_LEN) {
>> +		printf("INVALID_PARTITION_LENGTH\n");
>> +		return -1;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Validate the partition by calculationg the md5 checksum for the
>> + * partition and compare with checksum present in checksum offset of
>> + * partition
>> + */
>> +int zynq_validate_partition(u32 start_addr, u32 len, u32 chksum_off)
>> +{
>> +	u8 checksum[MD5_CHECKSUM_SIZE];
>> +	u8 calchecksum[MD5_CHECKSUM_SIZE];
>> +
>> +	memcpy(&checksum[0], (u32 *)chksum_off, MD5_CHECKSUM_SIZE);
>> +
>> +	md5_wd((u8 *)start_addr, len, &calchecksum[0], 0x10000);
>> +
>> +	if (!memcmp(checksum, calchecksum, MD5_CHECKSUM_SIZE))
>> +		return 0;
>> +
>> +	printf("Error: Partition DataChecksum\n");
>> +	return -1;
>> +}
>> diff --git a/board/xilinx/zynq/cmds.c b/board/xilinx/zynq/cmds.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 0000000..0b2a817
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/board/xilinx/zynq/cmds.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,513 @@
>> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
>> +/*
>> + * Copyright (C) 2018 Xilinx, Inc.
>> + */
>> +
>> +#include <common.h>
>> +#include <asm/io.h>
>> +#include <asm/arch/hardware.h>
>> +#include <asm/arch/sys_proto.h>
>> +#include <malloc.h>
>> +#include <u-boot/md5.h>
>> +#include <u-boot/rsa.h>
>> +#include <u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h>
>> +#include <u-boot/sha256.h>
>> +#include <zynqpl.h>
>> +#include <fpga.h>
>> +#include <zynq_bootimg.h>
>> +
>> +DECLARE_GLOBAL_DATA_PTR;
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_CMD_ZYNQ_RSA
>> +
>> +#define ZYNQ_EFUSE_RSA_ENABLE_MASK	0x400
>> +#define ZYNQ_ATTRIBUTE_PL_IMAGE_MASK		0x20
>> +#define ZYNQ_ATTRIBUTE_CHECKSUM_TYPE_MASK	0x7000
>> +#define ZYNQ_ATTRIBUTE_RSA_PRESENT_MASK		0x8000
>> +#define ZYNQ_ATTRIBUTE_RSA_PART_OWNER_MASK	0x30000
>> +
>> +#define ZYNQ_RSA_MODULAR_SIZE			256
>> +#define ZYNQ_RSA_MODULAR_EXT_SIZE		256
>> +#define ZYNQ_RSA_EXPO_SIZE			64
>> +#define ZYNQ_RSA_SPK_SIGNATURE_SIZE		256
>> +#define ZYNQ_RSA_PARTITION_SIGNATURE_SIZE	256
>> +#define ZYNQ_RSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE			0x6C0
>> +#define ZYNQ_RSA_HEADER_SIZE			4
>> +#define ZYNQ_RSA_MAGIC_WORD_SIZE		60
>> +#define ZYNQ_RSA_PART_OWNER_UBOOT		1
>> +#define ZYNQ_RSA_ALIGN_PPK_START		64
>> +
>> +#define WORD_LENGTH_SHIFT	2
>> +
>> +static u8 *ppkmodular;
>> +static u8 *ppkmodularex;
>> +
>> +struct zynq_rsa_public_key {
>> +	uint len;		/* Length of modulus[] in number of u32 */
>> +	u32 n0inv;		/* -1 / modulus[0] mod 2^32 */
>> +	u32 *modulus;	/* modulus as little endian array */
>> +	u32 *rr;		/* R^2 as little endian array */
>> +};
>> +
>> +static struct zynq_rsa_public_key public_key;
>> +
>> +static struct partition_hdr part_hdr[ZYNQ_MAX_PARTITION_NUMBER];
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Extract the primary public key components from already autheticated FSBL
>> + */
>> +static void zynq_extract_ppk(u32 fsbl_len)
>> +{
>> +	u32 padsize;
>> +	u8 *ppkptr;
>> +
>> +	debug("%s\n", __func__);
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Extract the authenticated PPK from OCM i.e at end of the FSBL
>> +	 */
>> +	ppkptr = (u8 *)(fsbl_len + ZYNQ_OCM_BASEADDR);
>> +	padsize = ((u32)ppkptr % ZYNQ_RSA_ALIGN_PPK_START);
>> +	if (padsize)
>> +		ppkptr += (ZYNQ_RSA_ALIGN_PPK_START - padsize);
>> +
>> +	ppkptr += ZYNQ_RSA_HEADER_SIZE;
>> +
>> +	ppkptr += ZYNQ_RSA_MAGIC_WORD_SIZE;
>> +
>> +	ppkmodular = (u8 *)ppkptr;
>> +	ppkptr += ZYNQ_RSA_MODULAR_SIZE;
>> +	ppkmodularex = (u8 *)ppkptr;
>> +	ppkptr += ZYNQ_RSA_MODULAR_EXT_SIZE;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Calculate the inverse(-1 / modulus[0] mod 2^32 ) for the PPK
>> + */
>> +static u32 zynq_calc_inv(void)
>> +{
>> +	u32 modulus = public_key.modulus[0];
>> +	u32 tmp = BIT(1);
>> +	u32 inverse;
>> +
>> +	inverse = modulus & BIT(0);
>> +
>> +	while (tmp) {
>> +		inverse *= 2 - modulus * inverse;
>> +		tmp *= tmp;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	return ~(inverse - 1);
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Recreate the signature by padding the bytes and verify with hash value
>> + */
>> +static int zynq_pad_and_check(u8 *signature, u8 *hash)
>> +{
>> +	u8 padding[] = {0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48,
>> +			0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04,
>> +			0x20};
>> +	u8 *pad_ptr = signature + 256;
>> +	u32 pad = 202;
>> +	u32 ii;
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Re-Create PKCS#1v1.5 Padding
>> +	 * MSB  ----------------------------------------------------LSB
>> +	 * 0x0 || 0x1 || 0xFF(for 202 bytes) || 0x0 || T_padding || SHA256 Hash
>> +	 */
>> +	if (*--pad_ptr != 0 || *--pad_ptr != 1)
>> +		return -1;
>> +
>> +	for (ii = 0; ii < pad; ii++) {
>> +		if (*--pad_ptr != 0xFF)
>> +			return -1;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	if (*--pad_ptr != 0)
>> +		return -1;
>> +
>> +	for (ii = 0; ii < sizeof(padding); ii++) {
>> +		if (*--pad_ptr != padding[ii])
>> +			return -1;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	for (ii = 0; ii < 32; ii++) {
>> +		if (*--pad_ptr != hash[ii])
>> +			return -1;
>> +	}
>> +	return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Verify and extract the hash value from signature using the public key
>> + * and compare it with calculated hash value.
>> + */
>> +static int zynq_rsa_verify_key(const struct zynq_rsa_public_key *key,
>> +			       const u8 *sig, const u32 sig_len, const u8 *hash)
>> +{
>> +	int status;
>> +	void *buf;
>> +
>> +	if (!key || !sig || !hash)
>> +		return -1;
>> +
>> +	if (sig_len != (key->len * sizeof(u32))) {
>> +		printf("Signature is of incorrect length %d\n", sig_len);
>> +		return -1;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	/* Sanity check for stack size */
>> +	if (sig_len > ZYNQ_RSA_SPK_SIGNATURE_SIZE) {
>> +		printf("Signature length %u exceeds maximum %d\n", sig_len,
>> +		       ZYNQ_RSA_SPK_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
>> +		return -1;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	buf = malloc(sig_len);
>> +	if (!buf)
>> +		return -1;
>> +
>> +	memcpy(buf, sig, sig_len);
>> +
>> +	status = zynq_pow_mod((u32 *)key, (u32 *)buf);
>> +	if (status == -1) {
>> +		free(buf);
>> +		return status;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	status = zynq_pad_and_check((u8 *)buf, (u8 *)hash);
>> +
>> +	free(buf);
>> +	return status;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Authenticate the partition
>> + */
>> +static int zynq_authenticate_part(u8 *buffer, u32 size)
>> +{
>> +	u8 hash_signature[32];
>> +	u8 *spk_modular;
>> +	u8 *spk_modular_ex;
>> +	u8 *signature_ptr;
>> +	u32 status;
>> +
>> +	debug("%s\n", __func__);
>> +
>> +	signature_ptr = (u8 *)(buffer + size - ZYNQ_RSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
>> +
>> +	signature_ptr += ZYNQ_RSA_HEADER_SIZE;
>> +
>> +	signature_ptr += ZYNQ_RSA_MAGIC_WORD_SIZE;
>> +
>> +	ppkmodular = (u8 *)signature_ptr;
>> +	signature_ptr += ZYNQ_RSA_MODULAR_SIZE;
>> +	ppkmodularex = signature_ptr;
>> +	signature_ptr += ZYNQ_RSA_MODULAR_EXT_SIZE;
>> +	signature_ptr += ZYNQ_RSA_EXPO_SIZE;
>> +
>> +	sha256_csum_wd((const unsigned char *)signature_ptr,
>> +		       (ZYNQ_RSA_MODULAR_EXT_SIZE + ZYNQ_RSA_EXPO_SIZE +
>> +		       ZYNQ_RSA_MODULAR_SIZE),
>> +		       (unsigned char *)hash_signature, 0x1000);
>> +
>> +	spk_modular = (u8 *)signature_ptr;
>> +	signature_ptr += ZYNQ_RSA_MODULAR_SIZE;
>> +	spk_modular_ex = (u8 *)signature_ptr;
>> +	signature_ptr += ZYNQ_RSA_MODULAR_EXT_SIZE;
>> +	signature_ptr += ZYNQ_RSA_EXPO_SIZE;
>> +
>> +	public_key.len = ZYNQ_RSA_MODULAR_SIZE / sizeof(u32);
>> +	public_key.modulus = (u32 *)ppkmodular;
>> +	public_key.rr = (u32 *)ppkmodularex;
>> +	public_key.n0inv = zynq_calc_inv();
>> +
>> +	status = zynq_rsa_verify_key(&public_key, signature_ptr,
>> +				     ZYNQ_RSA_SPK_SIGNATURE_SIZE,
>> +				     hash_signature);
>> +	if (status)
>> +		return status;
>> +
>> +	signature_ptr += ZYNQ_RSA_SPK_SIGNATURE_SIZE;
>> +
>> +	sha256_csum_wd((const unsigned char *)buffer,
>> +		       (size - ZYNQ_RSA_PARTITION_SIGNATURE_SIZE),
>> +		       (unsigned char *)hash_signature, 0x1000);
>> +
>> +	public_key.len = ZYNQ_RSA_MODULAR_SIZE / sizeof(u32);
>> +	public_key.modulus = (u32 *)spk_modular;
>> +	public_key.rr = (u32 *)spk_modular_ex;
>> +	public_key.n0inv = zynq_calc_inv();
>> +
>> +	return zynq_rsa_verify_key(&public_key, (u8 *)signature_ptr,
>> +				   ZYNQ_RSA_PARTITION_SIGNATURE_SIZE,
>> +				   (u8 *)hash_signature);
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Parses the partition header and verfies the authenticated and
>> + * encrypted image.
>> + */
>> +static int zynq_verify_image(u32 src_ptr)
>> +{
>> +	u32 silicon_ver, image_base_addr, status;
>> +	u32 partition_num = 0;
>> +	u32 efuseval, srcaddr, size, fsbl_len;
>> +	struct partition_hdr *hdr_ptr;
>> +	u32 part_data_len, part_img_len, part_attr;
>> +	u32 part_load_addr, part_dst_addr, part_chksum_offset;
>> +	u32 part_start_addr, part_total_size, partitioncount;
>> +	bool encrypt_part_flag = false;
>> +	bool part_chksum_flag = false;
>> +	bool signed_part_flag = false;
>> +
>> +	image_base_addr = src_ptr;
>> +
>> +	silicon_ver = zynq_get_silicon_version();
>> +
>> +	/* RSA not supported in silicon versions 1.0 and 2.0 */
>> +	if (silicon_ver == 0 || silicon_ver == 1)
>> +		return -1;
>> +
>> +	zynq_get_partition_info(image_base_addr, &fsbl_len,
>> +				&part_hdr[0]);
>> +
>> +	/* Extract ppk if efuse was blown Otherwise return error */
>> +	efuseval = readl(&efuse_base->status);
>> +	if (!(efuseval & ZYNQ_EFUSE_RSA_ENABLE_MASK))
>> +		return -1;
>> +
>> +	zynq_extract_ppk(fsbl_len);
>> +
>> +	partitioncount = zynq_get_part_count(&part_hdr[0]);
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * As the first two partitions are related to fsbl,
>> +	 * we can ignore those two in bootimage and the below
>> +	 * code doesn't need to validate it as fsbl is already
>> +	 * done by now
>> +	 */
>> +	if (partitioncount <= 2 ||
>> +	    partitioncount > ZYNQ_MAX_PARTITION_NUMBER)
>> +		return -1;
>> +
>> +	while (partition_num < partitioncount) {
>> +		if (((part_hdr[partition_num].partitionattr &
>> +		   ZYNQ_ATTRIBUTE_RSA_PART_OWNER_MASK) >> 16) !=
>> +		   ZYNQ_RSA_PART_OWNER_UBOOT) {
>> +			printf("UBOOT is not Owner for partition %d\n",
>> +			       partition_num);
>> +			partition_num++;
>> +			continue;
>> +		}
>> +		hdr_ptr = &part_hdr[partition_num];
>> +		status = zynq_validate_hdr(hdr_ptr);
>> +		if (status)
>> +			return status;
>> +
>> +		part_data_len = hdr_ptr->datawordlen;
>> +		part_img_len = hdr_ptr->imagewordlen;
>> +		part_attr = hdr_ptr->partitionattr;
>> +		part_load_addr = hdr_ptr->loadaddr;
>> +		part_chksum_offset = hdr_ptr->checksumoffset;
>> +		part_start_addr = hdr_ptr->partitionstart;
>> +		part_total_size = hdr_ptr->partitionwordlen;
>> +
>> +		if (part_data_len != part_img_len) {
>> +			debug("Encrypted\n");
>> +			encrypt_part_flag = true;
>> +		}
>> +
>> +		if (part_attr & ZYNQ_ATTRIBUTE_CHECKSUM_TYPE_MASK)
>> +			part_chksum_flag = true;
>> +
>> +		if (part_attr & ZYNQ_ATTRIBUTE_RSA_PRESENT_MASK) {
>> +			debug("RSA Signed\n");
>> +			signed_part_flag = true;
>> +			size = part_total_size << WORD_LENGTH_SHIFT;
>> +		} else {
>> +			size = part_img_len;
>> +		}
>> +
>> +		if (!signed_part_flag && !part_chksum_flag) {
>> +			printf("Partition not signed & no chksum\n");
>> +			partition_num++;
>> +			continue;
>> +		}
>> +
>> +		srcaddr = image_base_addr +
>> +			  (part_start_addr << WORD_LENGTH_SHIFT);
>> +
>> +		/*
>> +		 * This validation is just for PS DDR.
>> +		 * TODO: Update this for PL DDR check as well.
>> +		 */
>> +		if (part_load_addr < gd->bd->bi_dram[0].start &&
>> +		    ((part_load_addr + part_data_len) >
>> +		    (gd->bd->bi_dram[0].start +
>> +		     gd->bd->bi_dram[0].size))) {
>> +			printf("INVALID_LOAD_ADDRESS_FAIL\n");
>> +			return -1;
>> +		}
>> +
>> +		if (part_attr & ZYNQ_ATTRIBUTE_PL_IMAGE_MASK)
>> +			part_load_addr = srcaddr;
>> +		else
>> +			memcpy((u32 *)part_load_addr, (u32 *)srcaddr,
>> +			       size);
>> +
>> +		if (part_chksum_flag) {
>> +			part_chksum_offset = image_base_addr +
>> +					     (part_chksum_offset <<
>> +					     WORD_LENGTH_SHIFT);
>> +			status = zynq_validate_partition(part_load_addr,
>> +							 (part_total_size <<
>> +							  WORD_LENGTH_SHIFT),
>> +							 part_chksum_offset);
>> +			if (status != 0) {
>> +				printf("PART_CHKSUM_FAIL\n");
>> +				return -1;
>> +			}
>> +			debug("Partition Validation Done\n");
>> +		}
>> +
>> +		if (signed_part_flag) {
>> +			status = zynq_authenticate_part((u8 *)part_load_addr,
>> +							size);
>> +			if (status != 0) {
>> +				printf("AUTHENTICATION_FAIL\n");
>> +				return -1;
>> +			}
>> +			debug("Authentication Done\n");
>> +		}
>> +
>> +		if (encrypt_part_flag) {
>> +			debug("DECRYPTION\n");
>> +
>> +			part_dst_addr = part_load_addr;
>> +
>> +			if (part_attr & ZYNQ_ATTRIBUTE_PL_IMAGE_MASK) {
>> +				partition_num++;
>> +				continue;
>> +			}
>> +
>> +			status = zynq_decrypt_load(part_load_addr,
>> +						   part_img_len,
>> +						   part_dst_addr,
>> +						   part_data_len);
>> +			if (status != 0) {
>> +				printf("DECRYPTION_FAIL\n");
>> +				return -1;
>> +			}
>> +		}
>> +		partition_num++;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int do_zynq_rsa(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
>> +		       char * const argv[])
>> +{
>> +	u32 src_ptr;
>> +	char *endp;
>> +
>> +	src_ptr = simple_strtoul(argv[2], &endp, 16);
>> +	if (*argv[2] == 0 || *endp != 0)
>> +		return CMD_RET_USAGE;
>> +	if (zynq_verify_image(src_ptr))
>> +		return CMD_RET_FAILURE;
>> +
>> +	return CMD_RET_SUCCESS;
>> +}
>> +#endif
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_CMD_ZYNQ_AES
>> +static int zynq_decrypt_image(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
>> +			      char * const argv[])
>> +{
>> +	char *endp;
>> +	u32 srcaddr, srclen, dstaddr, dstlen;
>> +	int status;
>> +
>> +	srcaddr = simple_strtoul(argv[2], &endp, 16);
>> +	if (*argv[2] == 0 || *endp != 0)
>> +		return CMD_RET_USAGE;
>> +	srclen = simple_strtoul(argv[3], &endp, 16);
>> +	if (*argv[3] == 0 || *endp != 0)
>> +		return CMD_RET_USAGE;
>> +	dstaddr = simple_strtoul(argv[4], &endp, 16);
>> +	if (*argv[4] == 0 || *endp != 0)
>> +		return CMD_RET_USAGE;
>> +	dstlen = simple_strtoul(argv[5], &endp, 16);
>> +	if (*argv[5] == 0 || *endp != 0)
>> +		return CMD_RET_USAGE;
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Roundup source and destination lengths to
>> +	 * word size
>> +	 */
>> +	if (srclen % 4)
>> +		srclen = roundup(srclen, 4);
>> +	if (dstlen % 4)
>> +		dstlen = roundup(dstlen, 4);
>> +
>> +	status = zynq_decrypt_load(srcaddr, srclen >> 2, dstaddr, dstlen >> 2);
>> +	if (status != 0)
>> +		return CMD_RET_FAILURE;
>> +
>> +	return CMD_RET_SUCCESS;
>> +}
>> +#endif
>> +
>> +static cmd_tbl_t zynq_commands[] = {
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_CMD_ZYNQ_RSA
>> +	U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(rsa, 3, 1, do_zynq_rsa, "", ""),
>> +#endif
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_CMD_ZYNQ_AES
>> +	U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(aes, 6, 1, zynq_decrypt_image, "", ""),
>> +#endif
>> +};
>> +
>> +static int do_zynq(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[])
>> +{
>> +	cmd_tbl_t *zynq_cmd;
>> +	int ret;
>> +
>> +	if (!ARRAY_SIZE(zynq_commands)) {
>> +		puts("No zynq specific command enabled\n");
>> +		return CMD_RET_USAGE;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	if (argc < 2)
>> +		return CMD_RET_USAGE;
>> +	zynq_cmd = find_cmd_tbl(argv[1], zynq_commands,
>> +				ARRAY_SIZE(zynq_commands));
>> +	if (!zynq_cmd || argc != zynq_cmd->maxargs)
>> +		return CMD_RET_USAGE;
>> +
>> +	ret = zynq_cmd->cmd(zynq_cmd, flag, argc, argv);
>> +
>> +	return cmd_process_error(zynq_cmd, ret);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static char zynq_help_text[] =
>> +	""
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_CMD_ZYNQ_RSA
>> +	"rsa <baseaddr>  - Verifies the authenticated and encrypted\n"
>> +	"                  zynq images and loads them back to load\n"
>> +	"                  addresses as specified in BOOT image(BOOT.BIN)\n"
>> +#endif
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_CMD_ZYNQ_AES
>> +	"aes <srcaddr> <srclen> <dstaddr> <dstlen>\n"
>> +	"                - Decrypts the encrypted image present in source\n"
>> +	"                  address and places the decrypted image at\n"
>> +	"                  destination address\n"
>> +#endif
>> +	;
>> +
>> +U_BOOT_CMD(zynq,	6,	0,	do_zynq,
>> +	   "Zynq specific commands", zynq_help_text
>> +);
>> diff --git a/drivers/fpga/zynqpl.c b/drivers/fpga/zynqpl.c
>> index fd37d18..6409d30 100644
>> --- a/drivers/fpga/zynqpl.c
>> +++ b/drivers/fpga/zynqpl.c
>> @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
>>  
>>  #define DEVCFG_CTRL_PCFG_PROG_B		0x40000000
>>  #define DEVCFG_CTRL_PCFG_AES_EFUSE_MASK	0x00001000
>> +#define DEVCFG_CTRL_PCAP_RATE_EN_MASK	0x02000000
>>  #define DEVCFG_ISR_FATAL_ERROR_MASK	0x00740040
>>  #define DEVCFG_ISR_ERROR_FLAGS_MASK	0x00340840
>>  #define DEVCFG_ISR_RX_FIFO_OV		0x00040000
>> @@ -497,3 +498,47 @@ struct xilinx_fpga_op zynq_op = {
>>  	.loadfs = zynq_loadfs,
>>  #endif
>>  };
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_CMD_ZYNQ_AES
>> +/*
>> + * Load the encrypted image from src addr and decrypt the image and
>> + * place it back the decrypted image into dstaddr.
>> + */
>> +int zynq_decrypt_load(u32 srcaddr, u32 srclen, u32 dstaddr, u32 dstlen)
>> +{
>> +	if (srcaddr < SZ_1M || dstaddr < SZ_1M) {
>> +		printf("%s: src and dst addr should be > 1M\n",
>> +		       __func__);
>> +		return FPGA_FAIL;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	if (zynq_dma_xfer_init(BIT_NONE)) {
>> +		printf("%s: zynq_dma_xfer_init FAIL\n", __func__);
>> +		return FPGA_FAIL;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	writel((readl(&devcfg_base->ctrl) | DEVCFG_CTRL_PCAP_RATE_EN_MASK),
>> +	       &devcfg_base->ctrl);
>> +
>> +	debug("%s: Source = 0x%08X\n", __func__, (u32)srcaddr);
>> +	debug("%s: Size = %zu\n", __func__, srclen);
>> +
>> +	/* flush(clean & invalidate) d-cache range buf */
>> +	flush_dcache_range((u32)srcaddr, (u32)srcaddr +
>> +			roundup(srclen << 2, ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN));
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Flush destination address range only if image is not
>> +	 * bitstream.
>> +	 */
>> +	flush_dcache_range((u32)dstaddr, (u32)dstaddr +
>> +			   roundup(dstlen << 2, ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN));
>> +
>> +	if (zynq_dma_transfer(srcaddr | 1, srclen, dstaddr | 1, dstlen))
>> +		return FPGA_FAIL;
>> +
>> +	writel((readl(&devcfg_base->ctrl) & ~DEVCFG_CTRL_PCAP_RATE_EN_MASK),
>> +	       &devcfg_base->ctrl);
>> +
>> +	return FPGA_SUCCESS;
>> +}
>> +#endif
>> diff --git a/include/u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h b/include/u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h
>> index 3253614..8a428c4 100644
>> --- a/include/u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h
>> +++ b/include/u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h
>> @@ -42,6 +42,10 @@ int rsa_mod_exp_sw(const uint8_t *sig, uint32_t sig_len,
>>  int rsa_mod_exp(struct udevice *dev, const uint8_t *sig, uint32_t sig_len,
>>  		struct key_prop *node, uint8_t *out);
>>  
>> +#if defined(CONFIG_CMD_ZYNQ_RSA)
>> +int zynq_pow_mod(u32 *keyptr, u32 *inout);
>> +#endif
>> +
>>  /**
>>   * struct struct mod_exp_ops - Driver model for RSA Modular Exponentiation
>>   *				operations
>> diff --git a/include/zynq_bootimg.h b/include/zynq_bootimg.h
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 0000000..c39c0bf
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/include/zynq_bootimg.h
>> @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
>> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
>> +/*
>> + * Copyright (C) 2018 Xilinx, Inc.
>> + */
>> +
>> +#ifndef _ZYNQ_BOOTIMG_H_
>> +#define _ZYNQ_BOOTIMG_H_
>> +
>> +#define ZYNQ_MAX_PARTITION_NUMBER	0xE
>> +
>> +struct partition_hdr {
>> +	u32 imagewordlen;	/* 0x0 */
>> +	u32 datawordlen;	/* 0x4 */
>> +	u32 partitionwordlen;	/* 0x8 */
>> +	u32 loadaddr;		/* 0xC */
>> +	u32 execaddr;		/* 0x10 */
>> +	u32 partitionstart;	/* 0x14 */
>> +	u32 partitionattr;	/* 0x18 */
>> +	u32 sectioncount;	/* 0x1C */
>> +	u32 checksumoffset;	/* 0x20 */
>> +	u32 pads1[1];
>> +	u32 acoffset;	/* 0x28 */
>> +	u32 pads2[4];
>> +	u32 checksum;		/* 0x3C */
>> +};
>> +
>> +int zynq_get_part_count(struct partition_hdr *part_hdr_info);
>> +int zynq_get_partition_info(u32 image_base_addr, u32 *fsbl_len,
>> +			    struct partition_hdr *part_hdr);
>> +int zynq_validate_hdr(struct partition_hdr *header);
>> +int zynq_validate_partition(u32 start_addr, u32 len, u32 chksum_off);
>> +
>> +#endif /* _ZYNQ_BOOTIMG_H_ */
>> diff --git a/include/zynqpl.h b/include/zynqpl.h
>> index cdfd8a2..766e691 100644
>> --- a/include/zynqpl.h
>> +++ b/include/zynqpl.h
>> @@ -11,6 +11,10 @@
>>  
>>  #include <xilinx.h>
>>  
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_CMD_ZYNQ_AES
>> +int zynq_decrypt_load(u32 srcaddr, u32 dstaddr, u32 srclen, u32 dstlen);
>> +#endif
>> +
>>  extern struct xilinx_fpga_op zynq_op;
>>  
>>  #define XILINX_ZYNQ_XC7Z007S	0x3
>> diff --git a/lib/rsa/rsa-mod-exp.c b/lib/rsa/rsa-mod-exp.c
>> index 031c710..420ab2e 100644
>> --- a/lib/rsa/rsa-mod-exp.c
>> +++ b/lib/rsa/rsa-mod-exp.c
>> @@ -300,3 +300,54 @@ int rsa_mod_exp_sw(const uint8_t *sig, uint32_t sig_len,
>>  
>>  	return 0;
>>  }
>> +
>> +#if defined(CONFIG_CMD_ZYNQ_RSA)
>> +/**
>> + * zynq_pow_mod - in-place public exponentiation
>> + *
>> + * @keyptr:	RSA key
>> + * @inout:	Big-endian word array containing value and result
>> + * @return 0 on successful calculation, otherwise failure error code
>> + *
>> + * FIXME: Use pow_mod() instead of zynq_pow_mod()
>> + *        pow_mod calculation required for zynq is bit different from
>> + *        pw_mod above here, hence defined zynq specific routine.
>> + */
>> +int zynq_pow_mod(u32 *keyptr, u32 *inout)
>> +{
>> +	u32 *result, *ptr;
>> +	uint i;
>> +	struct rsa_public_key *key;
>> +	u32 val[RSA2048_BYTES], acc[RSA2048_BYTES], tmp[RSA2048_BYTES];
>> +
>> +	key = (struct rsa_public_key *)keyptr;
>> +
>> +	/* Sanity check for stack size - key->len is in 32-bit words */
>> +	if (key->len > RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS / 32) {
>> +		debug("RSA key words %u exceeds maximum %d\n", key->len,
>> +		      RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS / 32);
>> +		return -EINVAL;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	result = tmp;  /* Re-use location. */
>> +
>> +	for (i = 0, ptr = inout; i < key->len; i++, ptr++)
>> +		val[i] = *(ptr);
>> +
>> +	montgomery_mul(key, acc, val, key->rr);  /* axx = a * RR / R mod M */
>> +	for (i = 0; i < 16; i += 2) {
>> +		montgomery_mul(key, tmp, acc, acc); /* tmp = acc^2 / R mod M */
>> +		montgomery_mul(key, acc, tmp, tmp); /* acc = tmp^2 / R mod M */
>> +	}
>> +	montgomery_mul(key, result, acc, val);  /* result = XX * a / R mod M */
>> +
>> +	/* Make sure result < mod; result is at most 1x mod too large. */
>> +	if (greater_equal_modulus(key, result))
>> +		subtract_modulus(key, result);
>> +
>> +	for (i = 0, ptr = inout; i < key->len; i++, ptr++)
>> +		*ptr = result[i];
>> +
>> +	return 0;
>> +}
>> +#endif
>>
> 
> Applied.

Just a note. I have disable this command for cse platform and fix
dependency in Kconfig and applied.

Thanks,
Michal


-- 
Michal Simek, Ing. (M.Eng), OpenPGP -> KeyID: FE3D1F91
w: www.monstr.eu p: +42-0-721842854
Maintainer of Linux kernel - Xilinx Microblaze
Maintainer of Linux kernel - Xilinx Zynq ARM and ZynqMP ARM64 SoCs
U-Boot custodian - Xilinx Microblaze/Zynq/ZynqMP SoCs


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