[U-Boot] RSA verify code and required keys

[Simon Glass]

Hi Daniele,

On Fri, 13 Sep 2019 at 09:50, Daniele Alessandrelli
<daniele.alessandrelli at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> I was looking at the RSA image authentication code and I'm a bit
> puzzled by the following line of codes in lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c
> (https://gitlab.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c#L440):
>
> 436         /* See if we must use a particular key */
> 437         if (info->required_keynode != -1) {
> 438                 ret = rsa_verify_with_keynode(info, hash, sig, sig_len,
> 439                         info->required_keynode);
> 440                 if (!ret)
> 441                         return ret;
> 442         }
> 443
> 444         /* Look for a key that matches our hint */
> 445         snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "key-%s", info->keyname);
> 446         node = fdt_subnode_offset(blob, sig_node, name);
> 447         ret = rsa_verify_with_keynode(info, hash, sig, sig_len, node);
> 448         if (!ret)
> 449                 return ret;
>
> If I understand it correctly, at Line 440 we check if verification
> with the required key succeeded and if so we return otherwise we
> continue, trying other keys.

Yes that's my understanding too.

>
> Is that the intended behavior? Shouldn't the code return in any case
> (thus making the FIT verification process fail if the image couldn't
> be verified with the required key)? Or am I missing something?

Yes I think you are right. The documentation says:

- required: If present this indicates that the key must be verified for the
image / configuration to be considered valid. Only required keys are
normally verified by the FIT image booting algorithm. Valid values are
"image" to force verification of all images, and "conf" to force verification
of the selected configuration (which then relies on hashes in the images to
verify those).

The test coverage does not handle that case at present, but it should.

Regards,
Simon