[PATCH v2 14/14] qemu: arm64: Add documentation for capsule update

Sughosh Ganu sughosh.ganu at linaro.org
Mon Dec 21 12:43:14 CET 2020


Add documentation highlighting the steps for using the uefi capsule
update feature for updating the u-boot firmware image.

Signed-off-by: Sughosh Ganu <sughosh.ganu at linaro.org>
---

Changes since V1:
* Change the documentation to reflect the usage of overlays for
  embedding the public key certs at runtime
* Fix the build for 'make htmldocs'

 doc/board/emulation/qemu-arm.rst | 188 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 188 insertions(+)

diff --git a/doc/board/emulation/qemu-arm.rst b/doc/board/emulation/qemu-arm.rst
index 8d7fda10f1..11d91811b3 100644
--- a/doc/board/emulation/qemu-arm.rst
+++ b/doc/board/emulation/qemu-arm.rst
@@ -90,3 +90,191 @@ The debug UART on the ARM virt board uses these settings::
     CONFIG_DEBUG_UART_PL010=y
     CONFIG_DEBUG_UART_BASE=0x9000000
     CONFIG_DEBUG_UART_CLOCK=0
+
+Enabling Uefi Capsule Update feature
+------------------------------------
+
+Support has been added for the uefi capsule update feature which
+enables updating the u-boot image using the uefi firmware management
+protocol (fmp). The capsules are not passed to the firmware through
+the UpdateCapsule runtime service. Instead, capsule-on-disk
+functionality is used for fetching the capsule from the EFI System
+Partition (ESP).
+
+Currently, support has been added for updating the u-boot binary as a
+raw image when the platform is booted in non-secure mode, i.e with
+CONFIG_TFABOOT disabled. For this configuration, the qemu platform
+needs to be booted with 'secure=off'. The u-boot binary placed on the
+first bank of the Nor Flash at offset 0x0. The u-boot environment is
+placed on the second Nor Flash bank at offset 0x4000000.
+
+The capsule update feature is enabled with the following configs::
+
+    CONFIG_MTD=y
+    CONFIG_FLASH_CFI_MTD=y
+    CONFIG_CMD_MTDPARTS=y
+    CONFIG_CMD_DFU=y
+    CONFIG_DFU_MTD=y
+    CONFIG_PCI_INIT_R=y
+    CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_ON_DISK=y
+    CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT=y
+    CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE=y
+    CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_RAW=y
+    CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_FMP_HEADER=y
+
+In addition, the following config needs to be disabled::
+
+    CONFIG_TFABOOT
+
+The capsule file can be generated by using the GenerateCapsule.py
+script in edk2::
+
+    $ ./BaseTools/BinWrappers/PosixLike/GenerateCapsule -e -o \
+    <capsule_file_name> --fw-version <val> --lsv <val> --guid \
+    e2bb9c06-70e9-4b14-97a3-5a7913176e3f --verbose --update-image-index \
+    <val> --verbose <u-boot.bin>
+
+As per the uefi specification, the capsule file needs to be placed on
+the EFI System Partition, under the EFI/UpdateCapsule/ directory. The
+EFI System Partition can be a virtio-blk-device.
+
+Before initiating the firmware update, the efi variables BootNext,
+BootXXXX and OsIndications need to be set. The BootXXXX variable needs
+to be pointing to the EFI System Partition which contains the capsule
+file. The BootNext, BootXXXX and OsIndications variables can be set
+using the following commands::
+
+    => efidebug boot add 0 Boot0000 virtio 0:1 <capsule_file_name>
+    => efidebug boot next 0
+    => setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -v OsIndications =0x04
+    => saveenv
+
+Finally, the capsule update can be initiated with the following
+command::
+
+    => efidebug capsule disk-update
+
+The updated u-boot image will be booted on subsequent boot.
+
+Enabling Capsule Authentication
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+The uefi specification defines a way of authenticating the capsule to
+be updated by verifying the capsule signature. The capsule signature
+is computed and prepended to the capsule payload at the time of
+capsule generation. This signature is then verified by using the
+public key stored as part of the X509 certificate. This certificate is
+in the form of an efi signature list (esl) file, which is embedded as
+part of the platform's device tree blob using the mkeficapsule
+utility.
+
+On the qemu virt platforms, the device-tree is generated on the fly
+based on the devices configured. This device tree is then passed on to
+the various software components booting on the platform, including
+u-boot. Therefore, on the qemu virt platform, the signatute is
+embedded on an overlay. This overlay is then applied at runtime to the
+base platform device-tree. Steps needed for embedding the esl file in
+the overlay are highlighted below.
+
+The capsule authentication feature can be enabled through the
+following config, in addition to the configs listed above for capsule
+update::
+
+    CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE=y
+
+The public and private keys used for the signing process are generated
+and used by the steps highlighted below::
+
+    1. Install utility commands on your host
+       * openssl
+       * efitools
+
+    2. Create signing keys and certificate files on your host
+
+        $ openssl req -x509 -sha256 -newkey rsa:2048 -subj /CN=CRT/ \
+            -keyout CRT.key -out CRT.crt -nodes -days 365
+        $ cert-to-efi-sig-list CRT.crt CRT.esl
+
+        $ openssl x509 -in CRT.crt -out CRT.cer -outform DER
+        $ openssl x509 -inform DER -in CRT.cer -outform PEM -out CRT.pub.pem
+
+        $ openssl pkcs12 -export -out CRT.pfx -inkey CRT.key -in CRT.crt
+        $ openssl pkcs12 -in CRT.pfx -nodes -out CRT.pem
+
+The capsule file can be generated by using the GenerateCapsule.py
+script in edk2::
+
+    $ ./BaseTools/BinWrappers/PosixLike/GenerateCapsule -e -o \
+      <capsule_file_name> --monotonic-count <val> --fw-version \
+      <val> --lsv <val> --guid \
+      e2bb9c06-70e9-4b14-97a3-5a7913176e3f --verbose \
+      --update-image-index <val> --signer-private-cert \
+      /path/to/CRT.pem --trusted-public-cert \
+      /path/to/CRT.pub.pem --other-public-cert /path/to/CRT.pub.pem \
+      <u-boot.bin>
+
+Place the capsule generated in the above step on the EFI System
+Partition under the EFI/UpdateCapsule directory
+
+For embedding the public key certificate, the following steps need to
+be followed::
+
+    1. Generate a skeleton overlay dts file, with a single fragment
+       node and an empty __overlay__ node
+
+    2. Convert the dts to a corresponding dtb with the following
+       command
+        ./scripts/dtc/dtc -@ -I dts -O dtb -o <ov_dtb_file_name> \
+        <dts_file> 
+
+    3. Run the dtb file generated above through the mkeficapsule tool
+       in u-boot
+        ./tools/mkeficapsule -O <pub_key.esl> -D <ov_dtb> 
+
+Running the above command results in the creation of a 'signature'
+node in the dtb, under which the public key is stored as a
+'capsule-key' property. The '-O' option is to be used since the
+public key certificate(esl) file is being embedded in an overlay.
+
+The dtb file embedded with the certificate is now to be placed on an
+EFI System Partition. This would then be loaded and "merged" with the
+base platform fdt at runtime.
+
+Build u-boot with the following steps::
+
+    $ make qemu_arm64_defconfig
+    $ make menuconfig
+        Disable CONFIG_TFABOOT
+        Enable CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE
+        Enable all configs needed for capsule update(listed above)
+    $ make all
+
+Boot the platform and perform the following steps on the u-boot
+command line::
+
+    1. Enable capsule authentication by setting the following env
+       variable
+
+        => setenv capsule_authentication_enabled 1
+        => saveenv
+
+    2. Load the overlay dtb to memory and merge it with the base fdt
+
+        => fatload virtio 0:1 <$fdtovaddr> EFI/<ov_dtb_file>
+        => fdt addr $fdtcontroladdr
+        => fdt resize <size_of_ov_dtb_file>
+        => fdt apply <$fdtovaddr>
+
+    3. Set the following env and efi Boot variables
+
+        => setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -v OsIndications =0x04
+        => efidebug boot add 0 Boot0000 virtio 0:1 <capsule_file_name>
+        => efidebug boot next 0
+        => saveenv
+
+    4. Finally, the capsule update can be initiated with the following
+       command
+
+        => efidebug capsule disk-update
+
+On subsequent reboot, the platform should boot the updated u-boot binary.
-- 
2.17.1



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