[PATCH v7 0/7] rsa: extend rsa_verify() for UEFI secure boot

[Tom Rini]

On Fri, Feb 21, 2020 at 03:12:54PM +0900, AKASHI Takahiro wrote:

> # This patch set is a prerequisite for UEFI secure boot.
> 
> The current rsa_verify() requires five parameters for a RSA public key
> for efficiency while RSA, in theory, requires only two. In addition,
> those parameters are expected to come from FIT image.
> 
> So this function won't fit very well when we want to use it for the purpose
> of implementing UEFI secure boot, in particular, image authentication
> as well as variable authentication, where the essential two parameters
> are set to be retrieved from one of X509 certificates in signature
> database.
> 
> So, in this patch, additional three parameters will be calculated
> on the fly when rsa_verify() is called without fdt which should contain
> parameters above.
> 
> This calculation heavily relies on "big-number (or multi-precision)
> library." Therefore some routines from BearSSL[1] under MIT license are
> imported in this implementation. See Patch#4.
> # Please let me know if this is not appropriate.
> 
> Prerequisite:
> * public key parser in my "import x509/pkcs7 parser" patch[2]

This has been applied a long while back.

And for the record, without http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/1239098/
applied sandbox fails to build.  I had said I would take care of that
specific issue, so I'm just noting it here.  I'm kicking off a larger
test now.

-- 
Tom
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