[PATCH v2 10/21] arm: socfpga: Add secure register access helper functions for SoC 64bits

Ang, Chee Hong chee.hong.ang at intel.com
Fri Feb 21 20:06:17 CET 2020


> On 2/21/20 7:01 PM, Ang, Chee Hong wrote:
> >> On 2/20/20 6:54 PM, Ang, Chee Hong wrote:
> >>>> On 2/20/20 3:02 AM, Ang, Chee Hong wrote:
> >>>> [...]
> >>>>>>> +#if !defined(CONFIG_SPL_BUILD) && defined(CONFIG_SPL_ATF)
> >>>>>>> +u32 socfpga_secure_reg_read32(phys_addr_t reg_addr); void
> >>>>>>> +socfpga_secure_reg_write32(u32 val, phys_addr_t reg_addr); void
> >>>>>>> +socfpga_secure_reg_update32(phys_addr_t reg_addr, u32 mask, u32
> >>>>>>> +val); #else
> >>>>>>> +#define socfpga_secure_reg_read32	readl
> >>>>>>> +#define socfpga_secure_reg_write32	writel
> >>>>>>> +#define socfpga_secure_reg_update32	clrsetbits_le32
> >>>>>>> +#endif
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> I think I don't understand how this is supposed to work. Would
> >>>>>> every place in U- Boot have to be patched to call these functions now ?
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Not every register access need this. Only those accessing
> >>>>> registers in secure zone such as 'System Manager' registers need to call
> this.
> >>>>> It's basically determine whether the driver should issue SMC/PSCI
> >>>>> call if it's running in EL2 (non-secure) or access the registers
> >>>>> directly by simply using
> >>>> readl/writel and etc if it's running in EL3 (secure).
> >>>>> Accessing those registers in secure zone in non-secure mode (EL2)
> >>>>> will cause
> >>>> SError exception.
> >>>>> So we can determine this behaviour in compile time:
> >>>>> SPL always running in EL3. So it just simply fallback to use
> >>>> readl/writel/clrsetbits_le32.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> For U-Boot proper (SSBL), there are 2 scenarios:
> >>>>> 1) If CONFIG_SPL_ATF is defined, it means ATF is supported. It
> >>>>> implies that U-Boot proper will be running in EL2 (non-secure),
> >>>>> then it will use
> >>>> SMC/PSCI calls to access the secure registers.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> 2) CONFIG_SPL_ATF is not defined, no ATF support. U-Boot proper
> >>>>> will be running in EL3 which will fall back to simply using the
> >>>>> direct access functions
> >>>> (readl/writel and etc).
> >>>>
> >>>> I would expect the standard IO accessors would or should handle this stuff ?
> >>> Standard IO accessors are just general memory read/write functions
> >>> designed to be compatible with general hardware platforms. Not all
> >>> platforms have secure/non-secure hardware zones. I don't think they
> >>> should
> >> handle this.
> >>>
> >>> If it's running in EL3 (secure mode) the standard I/O accessors will
> >>> work just fine because
> >>> EL3 can access to all secure/non-secure zones. In the header file,
> >>> you can see the secure I/O accessors will be replaced by the
> >>> standard I/O accessors if it's built for SPL and U-Boot proper
> >>> without ATF. Because both are
> >> running in EL3 (secure).
> >>>
> >>> If ATF is enabled, SPL will be still running in EL3 but U-Boot
> >>> proper will be running in
> >>> EL2 (non-secure). If any code accessing those secure zones without
> >>> going through ATF (making SMC/PSCI calls to EL3), it will trigger 'SError'
> >> exceptions and crash the U-Boot.
> >>
> >> Hmmm, if U-Boot is running in EL2 (non-secure), why would it ever
> >> access secure zones in the first place ?
> > SPL and U-Boot reuse the same drivers code. It runs without issue in
> > SPL (EL3) but it crashes if running the same driver code in EL2 which access
> some secure zone registers.
> > The System Manager (secure zone) contains some register which control
> > the behaviours of EMAC/SDMMC and etc. Clock manager driver rely on
> > those registers in System Manager as well for retrieving clock
> > information. These clock/EMAC/SDMMC drivers access the System Manager
> (secure zone).
> 
> Maybe those registers should only be configured by the secure OS, so maybe
> those drivers should be fixed ?
> 
> >> And if that's really necessary, should the ATF really provide
> >> secure-mode register access primitives or should it provide some more high-
> level interface instead ?
> > I see your point. I should have mentioned to you that these
> > secure-mode register access provided by ATF actually do more stuffs than just
> primitive accessors.
> 
> So socfpga_secure_reg_read32 does not just read a register ? Then the naming
> is misleading . And documentation is missing.
> 
> > ATF only allow certain secure registers required by the non-secure driver to be
> accessed.
> > It will check the secure register address and block access if the
> > register address is not allowed to be accessed by non-secure world (EL2).
> 
> Why don't you configure those secure registers in the secure mode then ?
> It seems like that's the purpose of those registers being secure only.
> 
> > So these secure register access provided by ATF is not just simple
> > accessor/delegate which simply allow access to any secure zone from non-
> secure world without any restrictions.
> > I would say the secure register access provided by ATF is a
> > 'middle-level' interface not just some primitive accessors.
> >
> > Currently, we have like 20+ secure registers allowed access by drivers
> > running in non-secure mode (U-Boot proper / Linux).
> > I don't think we want to define and maintain those high level
> > interfaces for each of those secure register accesses in ATF and U-Boot.
> 
> See above.
OK. Then these secure access register should be set up in SPL (EL3).
U-Boot drivers shouldn't access them at all because the driver may be running
in SPL(EL3) and in U-Boot proper (EL2) too.
I can take a look at those drivers accessing secure registers and try
to move/decouple those secure access from U-Boot drivers to SPL (EL3) then we no
longer need those secure register access functions.
I am not sure doing this will impact the functionality of the U-Boot driver
running in EL2 or not.
I can refactor those drivers and try it out.


More information about the U-Boot mailing list