[PATCH v5 07/16] efi_loader: image_loader: support image authentication

[AKASHI Takahiro]

On Mon, Feb 24, 2020 at 07:29:17PM +0100, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote:
> On 1/28/20 9:25 AM, AKASHI Takahiro wrote:
> > With this commit, image validation can be enforced, as UEFI specification
> > section 32.5 describes, if CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT is enabled.
> > 
> > Currently we support
> > * authentication based on db and dbx,
> >    so dbx-validated image will always be rejected.
> > * following signature types:
> >      EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID (SHA256 digest for unsigned images)
> >      EFI_CERT_X509_GUID (x509 certificate for signed images)
> > Timestamp-based certificate revocation is not supported here.
> > 
> > Internally, authentication data is stored in one of certificates tables
> > of PE image (See efi_image_parse()) and will be verified by
> > efi_image_authenticate() before loading a given image.
> > 
> > It seems that UEFI specification defines the verification process
> > in a bit ambiguous way. I tried to implement it as closely to as
> > EDK2 does.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi at linaro.org>
> 
> According to git bisect this patch breaks the test
> test/py/tests/test_efi_fit.py.

This error only occurs on "compressed" FIT images. While I'm not sure
whether it is directly related to efi support in bootm or not, I've
fixed it any way.

Thanks,
-Takahiro Akashi


> Best regards
> 
> Heinrich