[PATCH v4 08/16] efi_loader: image_loader: support image authentication
Heinrich Schuchardt
xypron.glpk at gmx.de
Thu Jan 9 00:55:17 CET 2020
On 12/18/19 1:45 AM, AKASHI Takahiro wrote:
> With this commit, image validation can be enforced, as UEFI specification
> section 32.5 describes, if CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT is enabled.
>
> Currently we support
> * authentication based on db and dbx,
> so dbx-validated image will always be rejected.
> * following signature types:
> EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID (SHA256 digest for unsigned images)
> EFI_CERT_X509_GUID (x509 certificate for signed images)
> Timestamp-based certificate revocation is not supported here.
>
> Internally, authentication data is stored in one of certificates tables
> of PE image (See efi_image_parse()) and will be verified by
> efi_image_authenticate() before loading a given image.
>
> It seems that UEFI specification defines the verification process
> in a bit ambiguous way. I tried to implement it as closely to as
> EDK2 does.
>
> Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi at linaro.org>
> ---
> include/efi_loader.h | 7 +-
> lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c | 2 +-
> lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 454 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> 3 files changed, 449 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/efi_loader.h b/include/efi_loader.h
> index 1f88caf86709..e12b49098fb0 100644
> --- a/include/efi_loader.h
> +++ b/include/efi_loader.h
> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
> #include <common.h>
> #include <part_efi.h>
> #include <efi_api.h>
> +#include <pe.h>
>
> static inline int guidcmp(const void *g1, const void *g2)
> {
> @@ -398,7 +399,8 @@ efi_status_t efi_set_watchdog(unsigned long timeout);
> /* Called from places to check whether a timer expired */
> void efi_timer_check(void);
> /* PE loader implementation */
> -efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, void *efi,
> +efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle,
> + void *efi, size_t efi_size,
> struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image_info);
> /* Called once to store the pristine gd pointer */
> void efi_save_gd(void);
> @@ -726,6 +728,9 @@ void efi_sigstore_free(struct efi_signature_store *sigstore);
> struct efi_signature_store *efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u16 *name);
>
> bool efi_secure_boot_enabled(void);
> +
> +bool efi_image_parse(void *efi, size_t len, struct efi_image_regions **regp,
> + WIN_CERTIFICATE **auth, size_t *auth_len);
> #endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */
>
> #else /* CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(EFI_LOADER) */
> diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c
> index 493d906c641d..311681764034 100644
> --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c
> +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c
> @@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ efi_status_t EFIAPI efi_load_image(bool boot_policy,
> efi_dp_split_file_path(file_path, &dp, &fp);
> ret = efi_setup_loaded_image(dp, fp, image_obj, &info);
> if (ret == EFI_SUCCESS)
> - ret = efi_load_pe(*image_obj, dest_buffer, info);
> + ret = efi_load_pe(*image_obj, dest_buffer, source_size, info);
> if (!source_buffer)
> /* Release buffer to which file was loaded */
> efi_free_pages((uintptr_t)dest_buffer,
> diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
> index 13541cfa7a28..939758e61e3c 100644
> --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
> +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
> @@ -9,7 +9,9 @@
>
> #include <common.h>
> #include <efi_loader.h>
> +#include <malloc.h>
> #include <pe.h>
> +#include "../lib/crypto/pkcs7_parser.h"
>
> const efi_guid_t efi_global_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
> const efi_guid_t efi_guid_device_path = EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL_GUID;
> @@ -205,6 +207,367 @@ static void efi_set_code_and_data_type(
> }
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
> +/**
> + * efi_image_parse - parse a PE image
> + * @efi: Pointer to image
> + * @len: Size of @efi
> + * @regs: Pointer to a list of regions
> + * @auth: Pointer to a pointer to authentication data in PE
> + * @auth_len: Size of @auth
> + *
> + * Parse image binary in PE32(+) format, assuming that sanity of PE image
> + * has been checked by a caller.
> + * On success, an address of authentication data in @efi and its size will
> + * be returned in @auth and @auth_len, respectively.
> + *
> + * Return: true on success, false on error
> + */
> +bool efi_image_parse(void *efi, size_t len, struct efi_image_regions **regp,
> + WIN_CERTIFICATE **auth, size_t *auth_len)
This function is way too long (> 100 lines). Please, cut it into logical
units.
> +{
> + struct efi_image_regions *regs;
> + IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *dos;
> + IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *nt;
> + IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *sections, **sorted;
> + int num_regions, num_sections, i, j;
> + int ctidx = IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY;
> + u32 align, size, authsz, authoff;
> + size_t bytes_hashed;
> +
> + dos = (void *)efi;
> + nt = (void *)(efi + dos->e_lfanew);
> +
> + /*
> + * Count maximum number of regions to be digested.
> + * We don't have to have an exact number here.
> + * See efi_image_region_add()'s in parsing below.
> + */
> + num_regions = 3; /* for header */
> + num_regions += nt->FileHeader.NumberOfSections;
> + num_regions++; /* for extra */
> +
> + regs = calloc(sizeof(*regs) + sizeof(struct image_region) * num_regions,
> + 1);
> + if (!regs)
> + goto err;
> + regs->max = num_regions;
> +
> + /*
> + * Collect data regions for hash calculation
> + * 1. File headers
> + */
> + if (nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) {
> + IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *nt64 = (void *)nt;
> + IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER64 *opt = &nt64->OptionalHeader;
> +
> + /* Skip CheckSum */
> + efi_image_region_add(regs, efi, &opt->CheckSum, 0);
> + if (nt64->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes <= ctidx) {
> + efi_image_region_add(regs,
> + &opt->CheckSum + 1,
> + efi + opt->SizeOfHeaders, 0);
> + } else {
> + /* Skip Certificates Table */
> + efi_image_region_add(regs,
> + &opt->CheckSum + 1,
> + &opt->DataDirectory[ctidx], 0);
> + efi_image_region_add(regs,
> + &opt->DataDirectory[ctidx] + 1,
> + efi + opt->SizeOfHeaders, 0);
> + }
> +
> + bytes_hashed = opt->SizeOfHeaders;
> + align = opt->FileAlignment;
> + authoff = opt->DataDirectory[ctidx].VirtualAddress;
> + authsz = opt->DataDirectory[ctidx].Size;
> + } else if (nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
> + IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER32 *opt = &nt->OptionalHeader;
> +
> + efi_image_region_add(regs, efi, &opt->CheckSum, 0);
> + efi_image_region_add(regs, &opt->CheckSum + 1,
> + &opt->DataDirectory[ctidx], 0);
> + efi_image_region_add(regs, &opt->DataDirectory[ctidx] + 1,
> + efi + opt->SizeOfHeaders, 0);
> +
> + bytes_hashed = opt->SizeOfHeaders;
> + align = opt->FileAlignment;
> + authoff = opt->DataDirectory[ctidx].VirtualAddress;
> + authsz = opt->DataDirectory[ctidx].Size;
> + } else {
> + debug("%s: Invalid optional header magic %x\n", __func__,
> + nt->OptionalHeader.Magic);
> + goto err;
> + }
> +
> + /* 2. Sections */
> + num_sections = nt->FileHeader.NumberOfSections;
> + sections = (void *)((uint8_t *)&nt->OptionalHeader +
> + nt->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader);
> + sorted = calloc(sizeof(IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *), num_sections);
> + if (!sorted) {
> + debug("%s: Out of memory\n", __func__);
> + goto err;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Make sure the section list is in ascending order.
> + * As we can assume that it is already ordered in most cases,
> + * the following code is optimized for this.
> + */
> + for (sorted[0] = §ions[0], i = 1; i < num_sections; i++) {
If sections[0] is not the lowest entry this function fails.
Please, use qsort() supplied in lib/qsort.c.
> + if (sorted[i - 1]->VirtualAddress
> + <= sections[i].VirtualAddress) {
> + sorted[i] = §ions[i];
> + } else {
> + if (i == 1) {
> + sorted[1] = sorted[0];
> + sorted[0] = §ions[1];
> + continue;
> + }
> +
> + sorted[i] = sorted[i - 1];
> + for (j = i - 2; j >= 0; j--) {
> + if (!j || sorted[j]->VirtualAddress
> + <= sections[i].VirtualAddress) {
> + sorted[j + 1] = §ions[i];
> + continue;
> + } else {
> + sorted[j + 1] = sorted[j];
> + }
> + }
> + }
> + }
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < num_sections; i++) {
> + if (!sorted[i]->SizeOfRawData)
> + continue;
> +
> + size = (sorted[i]->SizeOfRawData + align - 1) & ~(align - 1);
> + efi_image_region_add(regs, efi + sorted[i]->PointerToRawData,
> + efi + sorted[i]->PointerToRawData + size,
> + 0);
> + debug("section[%d](%s): raw: 0x%x-0x%x, virt: %x-%x\n",
> + i, sorted[i]->Name,
> + sorted[i]->PointerToRawData,
> + sorted[i]->PointerToRawData + size,
> + sorted[i]->VirtualAddress,
> + sorted[i]->VirtualAddress
> + + sorted[i]->Misc.VirtualSize);
> +
> + bytes_hashed += size;
> + }
> + free(sorted);
> +
> + /* 3. Extra data excluding Certificates Table */
> + if (bytes_hashed + authsz < len) {
> + debug("extra data for hash: %lu\n",
> + len - (bytes_hashed + authsz));
> + efi_image_region_add(regs, efi + bytes_hashed,
> + efi + len - authsz, 0);
> + }
> +
> + /* Return Certificates Table */
> + if (authsz) {
> + if (len < authoff + authsz) {
> + debug("%s: Size for auth too large: %u >= %zu\n",
> + __func__, authsz, len - authoff);
> + goto err;
> + }
> + if (authsz < sizeof(*auth)) {
> + debug("%s: Size for auth too small: %u < %zu\n",
> + __func__, authsz, sizeof(*auth));
> + goto err;
> + }
> + *auth = efi + authoff;
> + *auth_len = authsz;
> + debug("WIN_CERTIFICATE: 0x%x, size: 0x%x\n", authoff, authsz);
> + } else {
> + *auth = NULL;
> + *auth_len = 0;
> + }
> +
> + *regp = regs;
> +
> + return true;
> +
> +err:
> + free(regs);
> +
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * efi_image_unsigned_authenticate - authenticate unsigned image with
> + * SHA256 hash
> + * @regs: List of regions to be verified
> + *
> + * If an image is not signed, it doesn't have a signature. In this case,
> + * its message digest is calculated and it will be compared with one of
> + * hash values stored in signature databases.
> + *
> + * Return: true if authenticated, false if not
> + */
> +static bool efi_image_unsigned_authenticate(struct efi_image_regions *regs)
> +{
> + struct efi_signature_store *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL;
> + bool ret = false;
> +
> + dbx = efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(L"dbx");
> + if (!dbx) {
> + debug("Getting signature database(dbx) failed\n");
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + db = efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(L"db");
> + if (!db) {
> + debug("Getting signature database(db) failed\n");
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + /* try black-list first */
> + if (efi_signature_verify_with_sigdb(regs, NULL, dbx, NULL)) {
> + debug("Image is not signed and rejected by \"dbx\"\n");
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + /* try white-list */
> + if (efi_signature_verify_with_sigdb(regs, NULL, db, NULL))
> + ret = true;
> + else
> + debug("Image is not signed and not found in \"db\" or \"dbx\"\n");
> +
> +out:
> + efi_sigstore_free(db);
> + efi_sigstore_free(dbx);
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * efi_image_authenticate - verify a signature of signed image
> + * @efi: Pointer to image
> + * @len: Size of @efi
> + *
> + * A signed image should have its signature stored in a table of its PE header.
> + * So if an image is signed and only if if its signature is verified using
> + * signature databases, an image is authenticated.
> + * If an image is not signed, its validity is checked by using
> + * efi_image_unsigned_authenticated().
> + * TODO:
> + * When AuditMode==0, if the image's signature is not found in
> + * the authorized database, or is found in the forbidden database,
> + * the image will not be started and instead, information about it
> + * will be placed in this table.
> + * When AuditMode==1, an EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO element is created
> + * in the EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE for every certificate found
> + * in the certificate table of every image that is validated.
> + *
> + * Return: true if authenticated, false if not
> + */
> +static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t len)
> +{
> + struct efi_image_regions *regs = NULL;
> + WIN_CERTIFICATE *wincerts = NULL, *wincert;
> + size_t wincerts_len;
> + struct pkcs7_message *msg = NULL;
> + struct efi_signature_store *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL;
> + struct x509_certificate *cert = NULL;
> + bool ret = false;
> +
> + if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled())
> + return true;
> +
> + if (!efi_image_parse(efi, len, ®s, &wincerts,
> + &wincerts_len)) {
> + debug("Parsing PE executable image failed\n");
> + return false;
> + }
> +
> + if (!wincerts) {
> + /* The image is not signed */
> + ret = efi_image_unsigned_authenticate(regs);
> + free(regs);
> +
> + return ret;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * verify signature using db and dbx
> + */
> + db = efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(L"db");
> + if (!db) {
> + debug("Getting signature database(db) failed\n");
> + goto err;
> + }
> +
> + dbx = efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(L"dbx");
> + if (!dbx) {
> + debug("Getting signature database(dbx) failed\n");
> + goto err;
> + }
> +
> + /* go through WIN_CERTIFICATE list */
> + for (wincert = wincerts;
> + (void *)wincert < (void *)wincerts + wincerts_len;
> + wincert = (void *)wincert + ALIGN(wincert->dwLength, 8)) {
> + if (wincert->dwLength < sizeof(*wincert)) {
> + debug("%s: dwLength too small: %u < %zu\n",
> + __func__, wincert->dwLength, sizeof(*wincert));
> + goto err;
> + }
> + msg = pkcs7_parse_message((void *)wincert + sizeof(*wincert),
> + wincert->dwLength - sizeof(*wincert));
> + if (!msg) {
> + debug("Parsing image's signature failed\n");
> + goto err;
> + }
> +
> + /* try black-list first */
> + if (efi_signature_verify_with_sigdb(regs, msg, dbx, NULL)) {
> + debug("Signature was rejected by \"dbx\"\n");
> + goto err;
> + }
> +
> + if (!efi_signature_verify_signers(msg, dbx)) {
> + debug("Signer was rejected by \"dbx\"\n");
> + goto err;
> + } else {
> + ret = true;
> + }
> +
> + /* try white-list */
> + if (!efi_signature_verify_with_sigdb(regs, msg, db, &cert)) {
> + debug("Verifying signature with \"db\" failed\n");
> + goto err;
> + } else {
> + ret = true;
> + }
> +
> + if (!efi_signature_verify_cert(cert, dbx)) {
> + debug("Certificate was rejected by \"dbx\"\n");
> + goto err;
> + } else {
> + ret = true;
> + }
> + }
> +
> +err:
> + x509_free_certificate(cert);
> + efi_sigstore_free(db);
> + efi_sigstore_free(dbx);
> + pkcs7_free_message(msg);
> + free(regs);
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +#else
> +static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t len)
> +{
> + return true;
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */
> +
> /**
> * efi_load_pe() - relocate EFI binary
> *
> @@ -216,7 +579,8 @@ static void efi_set_code_and_data_type(
> * @loaded_image_info: loaded image protocol
> * Return: status code
> */
> -efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, void *efi,
> +efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle,
> + void *efi, size_t efi_size,
> struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image_info)
> {
> IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *nt;
> @@ -231,17 +595,57 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, void *efi,
> uint64_t image_base;
> unsigned long virt_size = 0;
> int supported = 0;
> + void *new_efi = NULL;
> + size_t new_efi_size;
> + efi_status_t ret;
> +
> + /*
> + * Size must be 8-byte aligned and the trailing bytes must be
> + * zero'ed. Otherwise hash value may be incorrect.
> + */
> + if (efi_size & 0x7) {
> + new_efi_size = (efi_size + 0x7) & ~0x7ULL;
> + new_efi = calloc(new_efi_size, 1);
> + if (!new_efi)
> + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
> + memcpy(new_efi, efi, efi_size);
> + efi = new_efi;
> + efi_size = new_efi_size;
> + }
> +
> + /* Sanity check for a file header */
> + if (efi_size < sizeof(*dos)) {
> + printf("%s: Truncated DOS Header\n", __func__);
> + ret = EFI_LOAD_ERROR;
> + goto err;
> + }
>
> dos = efi;
> if (dos->e_magic != IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {
> printf("%s: Invalid DOS Signature\n", __func__);
> - return EFI_LOAD_ERROR;
> + ret = EFI_LOAD_ERROR;
> + goto err;
> + }
> +
> + /* assume sizeof(IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32) <= sizeof(IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64) */
> + if (efi_size < dos->e_lfanew + sizeof(IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32)) {
> + printf("%s: Invalid offset for Extended Header\n", __func__);
> + ret = EFI_LOAD_ERROR;
> + goto err;
> }
>
> nt = (void *) ((char *)efi + dos->e_lfanew);
> + if ((nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) &&
> + (efi_size < dos->e_lfanew + sizeof(IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64))) {
> + printf("%s: Invalid offset for Extended Header\n", __func__);
> + ret = EFI_LOAD_ERROR;
> + goto err;
> + }
> +
> if (nt->Signature != IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE) {
> printf("%s: Invalid NT Signature\n", __func__);
> - return EFI_LOAD_ERROR;
> + ret = EFI_LOAD_ERROR;
> + goto err;
> }
>
> for (i = 0; machines[i]; i++)
> @@ -253,14 +657,29 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, void *efi,
> if (!supported) {
> printf("%s: Machine type 0x%04x is not supported\n",
> __func__, nt->FileHeader.Machine);
> - return EFI_LOAD_ERROR;
> + ret = EFI_LOAD_ERROR;
> + goto err;
> }
>
> - /* Calculate upper virtual address boundary */
> num_sections = nt->FileHeader.NumberOfSections;
> sections = (void *)&nt->OptionalHeader +
> nt->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader;
>
> + if (efi_size < ((void *)sections + sizeof(sections[0]) * num_sections
> + - efi)) {
> + printf("%s: Invalid number of sections: %d\n",
> + __func__, num_sections);
> + ret = EFI_LOAD_ERROR;
> + goto err;
> + }
> +
> + /* Authenticate an image */
> + if (!efi_image_authenticate(efi, efi_size)) {
> + ret = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
According to the UEFI specification LoadImage() should return
EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION in this case.
Further behaviour should depend on variables AuditMode and DeployedMode.
If authentication fails, you must update the configuration table
identified by EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID containing the Image
Execution Information. If the authentication succeeds you may enter a
record.
It seems to me that in your patch series you are not creating the
configuration table at all.
The content of the Image Execution Information Table should be used to
decide if StartImage() may start an image. This is still missing in the
patch series.
Best regards
Heinrich
> + goto err;
> + }
> +
> + /* Calculate upper virtual address boundary */
> for (i = num_sections - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
> IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *sec = §ions[i];
> virt_size = max_t(unsigned long, virt_size,
> @@ -279,7 +698,8 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, void *efi,
> if (!efi_reloc) {
> printf("%s: Could not allocate %lu bytes\n",
> __func__, virt_size);
> - return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
> + ret = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
> + goto err;
> }
> handle->entry = efi_reloc + opt->AddressOfEntryPoint;
> rel_size = opt->DataDirectory[rel_idx].Size;
> @@ -295,7 +715,8 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, void *efi,
> if (!efi_reloc) {
> printf("%s: Could not allocate %lu bytes\n",
> __func__, virt_size);
> - return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
> + ret = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
> + goto err;
> }
> handle->entry = efi_reloc + opt->AddressOfEntryPoint;
> rel_size = opt->DataDirectory[rel_idx].Size;
> @@ -304,13 +725,16 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, void *efi,
> } else {
> printf("%s: Invalid optional header magic %x\n", __func__,
> nt->OptionalHeader.Magic);
> - return EFI_LOAD_ERROR;
> + ret = EFI_LOAD_ERROR;
> + goto err;
> }
>
> /* Copy PE headers */
> - memcpy(efi_reloc, efi, sizeof(*dos) + sizeof(*nt)
> - + nt->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader
> - + num_sections * sizeof(IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));
> + memcpy(efi_reloc, efi,
> + sizeof(*dos)
> + + sizeof(*nt)
> + + nt->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader
> + + num_sections * sizeof(IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));
>
> /* Load sections into RAM */
> for (i = num_sections - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
> @@ -327,7 +751,8 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, void *efi,
> (unsigned long)image_base) != EFI_SUCCESS) {
> efi_free_pages((uintptr_t) efi_reloc,
> (virt_size + EFI_PAGE_MASK) >> EFI_PAGE_SHIFT);
> - return EFI_LOAD_ERROR;
> + ret = EFI_LOAD_ERROR;
> + goto err;
> }
>
> /* Flush cache */
> @@ -340,4 +765,9 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, void *efi,
> loaded_image_info->image_size = virt_size;
>
> return EFI_SUCCESS;
> +
> +err:
> + free(new_efi);
> +
> + return ret;
> }
>
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