[PATCH 2/5] drivers: security: Add TPM2 implementation of security devices
Sean Edmond
seanedmond at linux.microsoft.com
Fri Aug 18 01:29:13 CEST 2023
Hi Simon,
On 2023-08-17 6:41 a.m., Simon Glass wrote:
> Hi Sean,
>
> On Fri, 11 Aug 2023 at 18:28, <seanedmond at linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
>> From: Stephen Carlson <stcarlso at linux.microsoft.com>
>>
>> This implementation of the security uclass driver allows existing TPM2
>> devices declared in the device tree to be referenced for storing the OS
>> anti-rollback counter, using the TPM2 non-volatile storage API.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Stephen Carlson <stcarlso at linux.microsoft.com>
>> ---
>> MAINTAINERS | 1 +
>> drivers/security/Makefile | 1 +
>> drivers/security/security-tpm.c | 173 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> include/tpm-v2.h | 1 +
>> 4 files changed, 176 insertions(+)
>> create mode 100644 drivers/security/security-tpm.c
> This is a bit wonky w.r.t driver model. The TPM itself should
> implement this API, perhaps ina separate file shared with all v2 TPMs.
> You should not be opening the device, etc. in here.
>
> I hope that makes sense...you effectively need to turn the TPM into a
> multi-function device within driver model. Of course TPMs are
> multi-function devices anyway, but here you are making their functions
> available more explicitly with a nicer API.
>
> Then you can call the TPM API to do what you want, but at least you
> know that the TPM has been probed before you start.
>
> Regards,
> Simon
>
Let's step back for a moment to understand our intention with this feature.
We want secure storage for the anti-rollback counter. The intention is
that this storage is provided by whatever "secure driver" (let's start
calling it the "rollback driver"). On our platform, we're using a
different "rollback driver" which accesses a non-TPM based secure
storage (which we can't upstream because it's proprietary). For the
purpose of making this feature publicly available, we've added the
TPM-backed "rollback driver" (this patch). I'll make this intention
more clear in the documentation, which should lead to less confusion?
At the end of the day, all we require is dm_security_arbvn_get() and
dm_security_arbvn_set(), to get/set from the secure storage (we'll
rename these to something less ugly, because yes arbvn is gross). We
don't want to lock this feature to the TPM, because it doesn't enable
us/others to choose a different secure storage mechanism.
W.r.t opening/initializing the TPM. Someone has to open it? In our
case, it's being opened earlier with our measured boot, so "-EBUSY" in
returned on tpm_open() (we return and everyone is happy). My
understanding is that this is the currently available way for multiple
drivers to access the TPM. Ilias has recommended we use
tpm_auto_start(), which is an enhancement I'm planning to make. This
should clean thing up? If this doesn't meet your expectations, can you
describe in more detail how we should turn the TPM into a
"multi-function device"?
>
>> diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
>> index 73b6943e03..257660a847 100644
>> --- a/MAINTAINERS
>> +++ b/MAINTAINERS
>> @@ -1444,6 +1444,7 @@ S: Maintained
>> F: drivers/security/Kconfig
>> F: drivers/security/Makefile
>> F: drivers/security/sandbox_security.c
>> +F: drivers/security/security-tpm.c
>> F: drivers/security/security-uclass.c
>>
>> SEMIHOSTING
>> diff --git a/drivers/security/Makefile b/drivers/security/Makefile
>> index ed10c3f234..e81966bb4a 100644
>> --- a/drivers/security/Makefile
>> +++ b/drivers/security/Makefile
>> @@ -4,3 +4,4 @@
>>
>> obj-$(CONFIG_DM_SECURITY) += security-uclass.o
>> obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SANDBOX) += sandbox_security.o
>> +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TPM) += security-tpm.o
>> diff --git a/drivers/security/security-tpm.c b/drivers/security/security-tpm.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 0000000000..9070dd49ac
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/drivers/security/security-tpm.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
>> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
>> +/*
>> + * Copyright (c) 2021 Microsoft, Inc
>> + * Written by Stephen Carlson <stcarlso at microsoft.com>
>> + */
>> +
>> +#include <common.h>
>> +#include <dm.h>
>> +#include <fdtdec.h>
>> +#include <dm-security.h>
>> +#include <tpm-v2.h>
>> +
>> +struct security_state {
>> + u32 index_arbvn;
>> + struct udevice *tpm_dev;
>> +};
>> +
>> +static int tpm_security_init(struct udevice *tpm_dev)
>> +{
>> + int res;
>> +
>> + /* Initialize TPM but allow reuse of existing session */
>> + res = tpm_open(tpm_dev);
>> + if (res == -EBUSY) {
>> + log(UCLASS_SECURITY, LOGL_DEBUG,
>> + "Existing TPM session found, reusing\n");
>> + } else {
>> + if (res) {
>> + log(UCLASS_SECURITY, LOGL_ERR,
>> + "TPM initialization failed (ret=%d)\n", res);
>> + return res;
>> + }
>> +
>> + res = tpm2_startup(tpm_dev, TPM2_SU_CLEAR);
>> + if (res) {
>> + log(UCLASS_SECURITY, LOGL_ERR,
>> + "TPM startup failed (ret=%d)\n", res);
>> + return res;
>> + }
>> + }
>> +
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int tpm_security_arbvn_get(struct udevice *dev, u64 *arbvn)
>> +{
>> + struct security_state *priv = dev_get_priv(dev);
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + if (!arbvn)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + ret = tpm2_nv_read_value(priv->tpm_dev, priv->index_arbvn, arbvn,
>> + sizeof(u64));
>> + if (ret == TPM2_RC_NV_UNINITIALIZED) {
>> + /* Expected if no OS image has been loaded before */
>> + log(UCLASS_SECURITY, LOGL_INFO,
>> + "No previous OS image, defaulting ARBVN to 0\n");
>> + *arbvn = 0ULL;
>> + } else if (ret) {
>> + log(UCLASS_SECURITY, LOGL_ERR,
>> + "Unable to read ARBVN from TPM (ret=%d)\n", ret);
>> + return ret;
>> + }
>> +
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int tpm_security_arbvn_set(struct udevice *dev, u64 arbvn)
>> +{
>> + struct security_state *priv = dev_get_priv(dev);
>> + struct udevice *tpm_dev = priv->tpm_dev;
>> + u64 old_arbvn;
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + ret = tpm_security_arbvn_get(dev, &old_arbvn);
>> + if (ret)
>> + return ret;
>> +
>> + if (arbvn < old_arbvn)
>> + return -EPERM;
>> +
>> + if (arbvn > old_arbvn) {
>> + ret = tpm2_nv_write_value(tpm_dev, priv->index_arbvn, &arbvn,
>> + sizeof(u64));
>> + if (ret) {
>> + log(UCLASS_SECURITY, LOGL_ERR,
>> + "Unable to write ARBVN to TPM (ret=%d)\n", ret);
>> + return ret;
>> + }
>> + }
>> +
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static const struct dm_security_ops tpm_security_ops = {
>> + .arbvn_get = tpm_security_arbvn_get,
>> + .arbvn_set = tpm_security_arbvn_set,
>> +};
>> +
>> +static int tpm_security_probe(struct udevice *dev)
>> +{
>> + struct security_state *priv = dev_get_priv(dev);
>> + struct udevice *tpm_dev = priv->tpm_dev;
>> + u32 index = priv->index_arbvn;
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + if (!tpm_dev) {
>> + log(UCLASS_SECURITY, LOGL_ERR,
>> + "TPM device not defined in DTS\n");
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> + }
>> +
>> + ret = tpm_security_init(tpm_dev);
>> + if (ret)
>> + return ret;
>> +
>> + ret = tpm2_nv_define_space(tpm_dev, index, sizeof(u64), TPMA_NV_PPREAD |
>> + TPMA_NV_PPWRITE | TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE,
>> + NULL, 0);
>> + /* NV_DEFINED is an expected error if ARBVN already initialized */
>> + if (ret == TPM2_RC_NV_DEFINED)
>> + log(UCLASS_SECURITY, LOGL_DEBUG,
>> + "ARBVN index %u already defined\n", index);
>> + else if (ret) {
>> + log(UCLASS_SECURITY, LOGL_ERR,
>> + "Unable to create ARBVN NV index (ret=%d)\n", ret);
>> + return ret;
>> + }
>> +
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int tpm_security_remove(struct udevice *dev)
>> +{
>> + struct security_state *priv = dev_get_priv(dev);
>> +
>> + return tpm_close(priv->tpm_dev);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int tpm_security_ofdata_to_platdata(struct udevice *dev)
>> +{
>> + const u32 phandle = (u32)dev_read_u32_default(dev, "tpm", 0);
>> + struct security_state *priv = dev_get_priv(dev);
>> + struct udevice *tpm_dev;
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + ret = uclass_get_device_by_phandle_id(UCLASS_TPM, phandle, &tpm_dev);
>> + if (ret) {
>> + log(UCLASS_SECURITY, LOGL_ERR, "TPM node in DTS is invalid\n");
>> + return ret;
>> + }
>> +
>> + priv->index_arbvn = (u32)dev_read_u32_default(dev, "arbvn-nv-index", 0);
>> + priv->tpm_dev = tpm_dev;
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static const struct udevice_id tpm_security_ids[] = {
>> + { .compatible = "tpm,security" },
>> + { }
>> +};
>> +
>> +U_BOOT_DRIVER(security_tpm) = {
>> + .name = "security_tpm",
>> + .id = UCLASS_SECURITY,
>> + .priv_auto = sizeof(struct security_state),
>> + .of_match = tpm_security_ids,
>> + .of_to_plat = tpm_security_ofdata_to_platdata,
>> + .probe = tpm_security_probe,
>> + .remove = tpm_security_remove,
>> + .ops = &tpm_security_ops,
>> +};
>> diff --git a/include/tpm-v2.h b/include/tpm-v2.h
>> index 2b6980e441..49bf0f0ba4 100644
>> --- a/include/tpm-v2.h
>> +++ b/include/tpm-v2.h
>> @@ -321,6 +321,7 @@ enum tpm2_return_codes {
>> TPM2_RC_COMMAND_CODE = TPM2_RC_VER1 + 0x0043,
>> TPM2_RC_AUTHSIZE = TPM2_RC_VER1 + 0x0044,
>> TPM2_RC_AUTH_CONTEXT = TPM2_RC_VER1 + 0x0045,
>> + TPM2_RC_NV_UNINITIALIZED = TPM2_RC_VER1 + 0x04a,
>> TPM2_RC_NV_DEFINED = TPM2_RC_VER1 + 0x004c,
>> TPM2_RC_NEEDS_TEST = TPM2_RC_VER1 + 0x0053,
>> TPM2_RC_WARN = 0x0900,
>> --
>> 2.40.0
>>
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