[PATCH 01/13] ti:keys Add EFI signature list

[Andrew Davis]

On 4/10/24 4:38 AM, Ilias Apalodimas wrote:
> On Tue, 9 Apr 2024 at 23:14, Andrew Davis <afd at ti.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 4/9/24 2:26 PM, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote:
>>> On 4/9/24 14:14, Andrew Davis wrote:
>>>> On 4/8/24 10:34 PM, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote:
>>>>> On 4/8/24 23:33, Jonathan Humphreys wrote:
>>>>>> EFI signature list using TI dummy keys.
>>>>>
>>>>> Adding vendor public keys into the code base to lock down generated
>>>>> binaries to the vendors unpublished private key does not match well with
>>>>> the intent of the GNU public license.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The matching private keys are already published in this same
>>>> repo/directory (arch/arm/mach-k3/keys).
>>>>
>>>> Andrew
>>>
>>> Why should we create signed capsules which are already compromised by
>>> publishing the private key?
>>>
>>
>> If you buy these devices you have two options, you can burn real
>> keys, or you can burn these dummy keys. If you burn dummy keys
>> then these images will boot and so will any image you or anyone
>> else wants to boot on the device. (since the keys are published
>> anyone can make images for them, that is how we do GP (general
>> purpose) devices these days)
>>
>> If you burn your own keys, then you switch out these keys here
>> and your device will only boot images that you permit by signing
>> with your keys.
> 
> I am not sure I am following you here.  We don't burn anything in the
> case of EFI keys. They are placed in an elf section and we assume the
> device will have a chain of trust enabled, naturally verifying those
> keys along with the u-boot binary.
> 

Right, you can (and probably should) use different keys stored in the
boot stages to verify the next stages. I was more giving the background
to why we publish our "private" keys at all here. Using the same keys
for every stage (including burning it in as the HW root of trust key)
is to make the examples here easier, but I think I see what you
are saying. It could be better to generate a key-pair as part of
this build for the EFI keys.

>>
>> You'll find plenty of open source projects do the same and
>> give out example keys to show how to use real keys, even
>> official GNU projects.
> 
> Yes, but the keys defined here are useless unless you have a default
> defconfig that uses them and embeds them in the binary. I am not cc'ed
> in all the patches of the series, is that added somewhere? And if you
> unconditionally enable secure boot It would be far more interesting to
> embed the MS SHIM key along with that special key you are trying to
> define, so that firmware can boot COTS distros as well
> 

Using MS SHIM keys here does sound interesting, I'll let Jon comment
on if we want to add that to this series or save for later.

Thanks,
Andrew

> Thanks
> /Ilias
> 
> 
>>
>> https://github.com/gpg/gnupg/tree/master/tests/openpgp/samplekeys
>>
>> Andrew
>>
>>> Best regards
>>>
>>> Heinrich
>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Best regards
>>>>>
>>>>> Heinrich
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Humphreys <j-humphreys at ti.com>
>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>    arch/arm/mach-k3/keys/custMpk.esl | Bin 0 -> 1523 bytes
>>>>>>    1 file changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
>>>>>>    create mode 100644 arch/arm/mach-k3/keys/custMpk.esl
>>>>>>
>>>>>> diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-k3/keys/custMpk.esl
>>>>>> b/arch/arm/mach-k3/keys/custMpk.esl
>>>>>> new file mode 100644
>>>>>> index
>>>>>> 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2feb704e0a5fd126410de451d3c0fa4d3edccc52
>>>>>> GIT binary patch
>>>>>> literal 1523
>>>>>> zcmZ1&d0^?2Da*aux2_hA(f&~MnUw(yu0v at E4?-F=u^u*PVqVQ8QZ((-^A*$m*Kg7c
>>>>>> z&78AJODc2mtxpELY at Awc9&O)w85y}*84Mcd8gd(OvN4CUun9AT2E#ZUJWL at GhWtR)
>>>>>> zKpA!(HkZVloWx>7bput902hy3NNPo5v4Uq_aY<2WZfaf$h at G5YRFGekSdyAzC~P1I
>>>>>> zQpnB26;PC)oLXF*UsMbeWai-t at l*&dEdVMmF_blshP#N9QH-w`BJNO<sh6CeYal1i
>>>>>> zYh-L-W?*PwYGi0=7A4MWYz$;tLb-$9{Y^|t$U)A?%D~*j#Lr;R#Kgta#Kg$3Uu2!<
>>>>>> zjryX?*~({Md+?>+QS$x7=il`0?bc6sZ`Vxxl^6N{>i2E;SY*4-T$+0G;)5dxe+2CR
>>>>>> z at 4+)sDPWdQb@%6KTpDVdm)v}?GSpG(w_UV)&i+#e3fJowDZO)JR83lIcbw(hMu}}Y
>>>>>> z2ZZwYAI-LVx@^G;HdkgxaX&Hnl_l3&{H|3l7uX at Vl5di{>fQQ{pDynFlySp2(z~g)
>>>>>> z{LIBUzm&K9j_CMw_SIFfPdcT#zmg6g<ji}(R`6geJLk-#o7bK^&&fT}#2zsD`=c9g
>>>>>> zFUCK<Fz@{2kel&$W6zl<d|WNk#ZsNRd{_N_SJxWvh0*K$j!m)c at oT>{#b(Lp`M3Uj
>>>>>> zGOKycyEe+n{G(Rmg}jB!)0ySk-!kkj_R7#OT+}pcG0VXh?f+ftRvnyw#hUea^Iyfn
>>>>>> ze|zgKPKrqe at jYWU?v<50X(n^lZ*G%j$JyCh`*Px|H*K=2WXP)hx>jng+}Q}N^KoDN
>>>>>> z8dh8T-~Dmrp2?yk3O6Gqbz7O@<TEz<^zIa7d#PKtHKHeAg?V0DMSin^o3F|IEfQWk
>>>>>> zcmJwBy6&2hKub%G{j3IK(?7m at uI43#1e~wSZJ5sTtDjrp at 7@{O3(faN{`Gp}x{$M5
>>>>>> z{A7`c at pjfYq1Z=JvgZ^-zCC<(HFTBwYhTX$k`7IJX`SM!H}f`Mv+(Op6uVY(<(^o4
>>>>>> zpyXAj9nF_c-1A<UIel9%6Eh<NBXSA>W=dcRVPvS;*B%(4`P|iK>Vg$XDgN9sr}Df{
>>>>>> z7X0es=RPHr8RB+*)}q}h%gn?x9PO4y*Qog};x<<LS+lxk$@$kYlG_hXu6p%jvB<%l
>>>>>> zmcsdI9w!^rFPt^&c~{1?L~DJ4TRPv>t%rn8xi;KBE9A!Dppb9yru|>RCb9PcXWpE>
>>>>>> zKlQ}fzw*izXI|}|r!O*nb&cP9#VhHRn;B<SRflN2Jl(*;W4e0LD$ORRIdjjhURZH+
>>>>>> zXWR0Vllb2@>`1LC^xvIctvLCYhRA_6yCS~2&!0SH1xwv(O~<l(HQxHJxzF!T_>+5t
>>>>>> z^|E$S{MM^8j9J5`sQ6pud{2Lz?k`zncbjvHj%eutjusUol}8;%cbPLCO|e;ZJ^tXe
>>>>>> z_N{pmM}uCi3UWO3=hMc<s}m1Jx4GS4F(<_N`R|o+)eAK3Yx{o$ygRe!;<_EoF&UhP
>>>>>> zrslJ=2XA9^$j#UDYwo;ZvZwb!|L%YP%v|ie|7-1PP+q3DZ&vEWgHHrjHv|NzEVjO?
>>>>>> zKFeRbXv>iTPl?N16Xv at buq_d@TU<MB;uD_jX^$J`&*C>`uX0_s&g9M2C6cKx4E;{?
>>>>>> zt`1&)Tk-yb?sKMPI~!}xt*d*!tMat!r1`}jul#i at lDB8rnu>ba_-^4!iQ5{|tb3TX
>>>>>> z>fTMIw2!Me3{Dw*WZotC<4 at h<H`zaL+~Es<{Ccj5yS7zyNU!YsTG`^JqA6NkU%vnV
>>>>>> D66<<J
>>>>>>
>>>>>> literal 0
>>>>>> HcmV?d00001
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>