[PATCH v7 02/10] spl: make CMD_BOOTZ exclusive with TI_SECURE_DEVICE

[Tom Rini]

On Tue, Jun 03, 2025 at 07:54:42PM +0530, Anshul Dalal wrote:

> In the secure OS_BOOT spl execution code path, CMD_BOOTZ enables loading
> of a zImage which might allow an attacker to bypass the authenticated
> boot with fitImage by replacing it with a malicious image with header
> identical to zImage.
> 
> Disabling CMD_BOOTZ ensures this code path is never hit inside
> spl_parse_image_header.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Anshul Dalal <anshuld at ti.com>

Reviewed-by: Tom Rini <trini at konsulko.com>

-- 
Tom
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