[U-Boot] [PATCH 3/5] SECURE BOOT: Add command for validation of images
Gaurav Rana
gaurav.rana at freescale.com
Tue Feb 24 08:38:17 CET 2015
1. esbc_validate command is meant for validating header and
signature of images (Boot Script and ESBC uboot client).
SHA-256 and RSA operations are performed using SEC block in HW.
This command works on both PBL based and Non PBL based Freescale
platforms.
Command usage:
esbc_validate img_hdr_addr [pub_key_hash]
2. ESBC uboot client can be linux. Additionally, rootfs and device
tree blob can also be signed.
3. In the event of header or signature failure in validation,
ITS and ITF bits determine further course of action.
4. In case of soft failure, appropriate error is dumped on console.
5. In case of hard failure, SoC is issued RESET REQUEST after
dumping error on the console.
6. KEY REVOCATION Feature:
QorIQ platforms like B4/T4 have support of srk key table and key
revocation in ISBC code in Silicon.
The srk key table allows the user to have a key table with multiple
keys and revoke any key in case of particular key gets compromised.
In case the ISBC code uses the key revocation and srk key table to
verify the u-boot code, the subsequent chain of trust should also
use the same.
6. ISBC KEY EXTENSION Feature:
This feature allows large number of keys to be used for esbc validation
of images. A set of public keys is being signed and validated by ISBC
which can be further used for esbc validation of images.
Signed-off-by: Ruchika Gupta <ruchika.gupta at freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Gaurav Rana <gaurav.rana at freescale.com>
---
board/freescale/common/cmd_esbc_validate.c | 34 ++
board/freescale/common/fsl_validate.c | 840 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
doc/README.esbc_validate | 41 ++
include/fsl_secboot_err.h | 128 +++++
include/fsl_validate.h | 199 +++++++
5 files changed, 1242 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 board/freescale/common/cmd_esbc_validate.c
create mode 100644 board/freescale/common/fsl_validate.c
create mode 100644 doc/README.esbc_validate
create mode 100644 include/fsl_secboot_err.h
create mode 100644 include/fsl_validate.h
diff --git a/board/freescale/common/cmd_esbc_validate.c b/board/freescale/common/cmd_esbc_validate.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2a5cb8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/board/freescale/common/cmd_esbc_validate.c
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2010-2012 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+ */
+
+#include <common.h>
+#include <command.h>
+#include <fsl_validate.h>
+
+static int do_esbc_validate(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
+ char * const argv[])
+{
+ if (argc < 2)
+ return cmd_usage(cmdtp);
+
+ return fsl_secboot_validate(cmdtp, flag, argc, argv);
+}
+
+/***************************************************/
+static char esbc_validate_help_text[] =
+ "esbc_validate hdr_addr <hash_val> - Validates signature using\n"
+ " RSA verification\n"
+ " $hdr_addr Address of header of the image\n"
+ " to be validated.\n"
+ " $hash_val -Optional\n"
+ " It provides Hash of public/srk key to be\n"
+ " used to verify signature.\n";
+
+U_BOOT_CMD(
+ esbc_validate, 3, 0, do_esbc_validate,
+ "Validates signature on a given image using RSA verification",
+ esbc_validate_help_text
+);
diff --git a/board/freescale/common/fsl_validate.c b/board/freescale/common/fsl_validate.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cb89042
--- /dev/null
+++ b/board/freescale/common/fsl_validate.c
@@ -0,0 +1,840 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2010-2012 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+ */
+
+#include <common.h>
+#include <fsl_validate.h>
+#include <fsl_secboot_err.h>
+#include <fsl_sfp.h>
+#include <fsl_sec.h>
+#include <command.h>
+#include <malloc.h>
+#include <dm/uclass.h>
+#include <u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h>
+#include <hash.h>
+#include <fsl_secboot_err.h>
+#ifndef CONFIG_MPC85xx
+#include <asm/arch/immap_ls102xa.h>
+#endif
+
+#define SHA256_BITS 256
+#define SHA256_BYTES (256/8)
+#define SHA256_NIBBLES (256/4)
+#define NUM_HEX_CHARS (sizeof(ulong) * 2)
+
+/* This array contains DER value for SHA-256 */
+static const u8 hash_identifier[] = { 0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60,
+ 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00,
+ 0x04, 0x20
+ };
+
+static u8 hash_val[SHA256_BYTES];
+static const u8 barker_code[ESBC_BARKER_LEN] = { 0x68, 0x39, 0x27, 0x81 };
+
+void branch_to_self(void) __attribute__ ((noreturn));
+
+/*
+ * This function will put core in infinite loop.
+ * This will be called when the ESBC can not proceed further due
+ * to some unknown errors.
+ */
+void branch_to_self(void)
+{
+ printf("Core is in infinite loop due to errors.\n");
+self:
+ goto self;
+}
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_FSL_ISBC_KEY_EXT)
+static u32 check_ie(struct fsl_secboot_img_priv *img)
+{
+ if (img->hdr.ie_flag)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* This function returns the CSF Header Address of uboot
+ * For MPC85xx based platforms, the LAW mapping for NOR
+ * flash changes in uboot code. Hence the offset needs
+ * to be calculated and added to the new NOR flash base
+ * address
+ */
+#if defined(CONFIG_MPC85xx)
+int get_csf_base_addr(ulong *csf_addr, ulong *flash_base_addr)
+{
+ struct ccsr_gur __iomem *gur = (void *)(CONFIG_SYS_MPC85xx_GUTS_ADDR);
+ u32 csf_hdr_addr = in_be32(&gur->scratchrw[0]);
+ u32 csf_flash_offset = csf_hdr_addr & ~(CONFIG_SYS_PBI_FLASH_BASE);
+ ulong flash_addr, addr;
+ int found = 0;
+ int i = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < CONFIG_SYS_MAX_FLASH_BANKS; i++) {
+ flash_addr = flash_info[i].start[0];
+ addr = flash_info[i].start[0] + csf_flash_offset;
+ if (memcmp((u8 *)addr, barker_code, ESBC_BARKER_LEN) == 0) {
+ debug("Barker found on addr %lx\n", addr);
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!found)
+ return -1;
+
+ *csf_addr = addr;
+ *flash_base_addr = flash_addr;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#else
+/* For platforms like LS1020, correct flash address is present in
+ * the header. So the function reqturns flash base address as 0
+ */
+int get_csf_base_addr(ulong *csf_addr, ulong *flash_base_addr)
+{
+ struct ccsr_gur __iomem *gur = (void *)(CONFIG_SYS_FSL_GUTS_ADDR);
+ u32 csf_hdr_addr = in_be32(&gur->scratchrw[0]);
+
+ if (memcmp((u8 *)csf_hdr_addr, barker_code, ESBC_BARKER_LEN))
+ return -1;
+
+ *csf_addr = csf_hdr_addr;
+ *flash_base_addr = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int get_ie_info_addr(ulong *ie_addr)
+{
+ struct fsl_secboot_img_hdr *hdr;
+ struct fsl_secboot_sg_table *sg_tbl;
+ ulong flash_base_addr, csf_addr;
+
+ if (get_csf_base_addr(&csf_addr, &flash_base_addr))
+ return -1;
+
+ hdr = (struct fsl_secboot_img_hdr *)csf_addr;
+
+ /* For SoC's with Trust Architecture v1 with corenet bus
+ * the sg table field in CSF header has absolute address
+ * for sg table in memory. In other Trust Architecture,
+ * this field specifies the offset of sg table from the
+ * base address of CSF Header
+ */
+#if defined(CONFIG_FSL_TRUST_ARCH_v1) && defined(CONFIG_FSL_CORENET)
+ sg_tbl = (struct fsl_secboot_sg_table *)
+ (((ulong)hdr->psgtable & ~(CONFIG_SYS_PBI_FLASH_BASE)) +
+ flash_base_addr);
+#else
+ sg_tbl = (struct fsl_secboot_sg_table *)(csf_addr +
+ (ulong)hdr->psgtable);
+#endif
+
+ /* IE Key Table is the first entry in the SG Table */
+#if defined(CONFIG_MPC85xx)
+ *ie_addr = (sg_tbl->src_addr & ~(CONFIG_SYS_PBI_FLASH_BASE)) +
+ flash_base_addr;
+#else
+ *ie_addr = sg_tbl->src_addr;
+#endif
+
+ debug("IE Table address is %lx\n", *ie_addr);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_REVOCATION
+/* This function checks srk_table_flag in header and set/reset srk_flag.*/
+static u32 check_srk(struct fsl_secboot_img_priv *img)
+{
+ if (img->hdr.len_kr.srk_table_flag & SRK_FLAG)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* This function returns ospr's key_revoc values.*/
+static u32 get_key_revoc(void)
+{
+ struct ccsr_sfp_regs *sfp_regs = (void *)(CONFIG_SYS_SFP_ADDR);
+ return (sfp_in32(&sfp_regs->ospr) & OSPR_KEY_REVOC_MASK) >>
+ OSPR_KEY_REVOC_SHIFT;
+}
+
+/* This function checks if selected key is revoked or not.*/
+static u32 is_key_revoked(u32 keynum, u32 rev_flag)
+{
+ if (keynum == UNREVOCABLE_KEY)
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((u32)(1 << (ALIGN_REVOC_KEY - keynum)) & rev_flag)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* It validates srk_table key lengths.*/
+static u32 validate_srk_tbl(struct srk_table *tbl, u32 num_entries)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < num_entries; i++) {
+ if (!((tbl[i].key_len == 2 * KEY_SIZE_BYTES/4) ||
+ (tbl[i].key_len == 2 * KEY_SIZE_BYTES/2) ||
+ (tbl[i].key_len == 2 * KEY_SIZE_BYTES)))
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INV_SRK_ENTRY_KEYLEN;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* This function return length of public key.*/
+static inline u32 get_key_len(struct fsl_secboot_img_priv *img)
+{
+ return img->key_len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handles the ESBC uboot client header verification failure.
+ * This function handles all the errors which might occur in the
+ * parsing and checking of ESBC uboot client header. It will also
+ * set the error bits in the SEC_MON.
+ */
+static void fsl_secboot_header_verification_failure(void)
+{
+ struct ccsr_sec_mon_regs *sec_mon_regs = (void *)
+ (CONFIG_SYS_SEC_MON_ADDR);
+ struct ccsr_sfp_regs *sfp_regs = (void *)(CONFIG_SYS_SFP_ADDR);
+ u32 sts = sec_mon_in32(&sec_mon_regs->hp_stat);
+
+ /* 29th bit of OSPR is ITS */
+ u32 its = sfp_in32(&sfp_regs->ospr) >> 2;
+
+ /*
+ * Read the SEC_MON status register
+ * Read SSM_ST field
+ */
+ sts = sec_mon_in32(&sec_mon_regs->hp_stat);
+ if ((sts & HPSR_SSM_ST_MASK) == HPSR_SSM_ST_TRUST) {
+ if (its == 1)
+ change_sec_mon_state(HPSR_SSM_ST_TRUST,
+ HPSR_SSM_ST_SOFT_FAIL);
+ else
+ change_sec_mon_state(HPSR_SSM_ST_TRUST,
+ HPSR_SSM_ST_NON_SECURE);
+ }
+
+ printf("Generating reset request\n");
+ do_reset(NULL, 0, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handles the ESBC uboot client image verification failure.
+ * This function handles all the errors which might occur in the
+ * public key hash comparison and signature verification of
+ * ESBC uboot client image. It will also
+ * set the error bits in the SEC_MON.
+ */
+static void fsl_secboot_image_verification_failure(void)
+{
+ struct ccsr_sec_mon_regs *sec_mon_regs = (void *)
+ (CONFIG_SYS_SEC_MON_ADDR);
+ struct ccsr_sfp_regs *sfp_regs = (void *)(CONFIG_SYS_SFP_ADDR);
+ u32 sts = sec_mon_in32(&sec_mon_regs->hp_stat);
+
+ u32 its = sfp_in32(&sfp_regs->ospr) & ITS_MASK >> ITS_BIT;
+
+ /*
+ * Read the SEC_MON status register
+ * Read SSM_ST field
+ */
+ sts = sec_mon_in32(&sec_mon_regs->hp_stat);
+ if ((sts & HPSR_SSM_ST_MASK) == HPSR_SSM_ST_TRUST) {
+ if (its == 1) {
+ change_sec_mon_state(HPSR_SSM_ST_TRUST,
+ HPSR_SSM_ST_SOFT_FAIL);
+
+ printf("Generating reset request\n");
+ do_reset(NULL, 0, 0, NULL);
+ } else {
+ change_sec_mon_state(HPSR_SSM_ST_TRUST,
+ HPSR_SSM_ST_NON_SECURE);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void fsl_secboot_bootscript_parse_failure(void)
+{
+ fsl_secboot_header_verification_failure();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handles the errors in esbc boot.
+ * This function handles all the errors which might occur in the
+ * esbc boot phase. It will call the appropriate api to log the
+ * errors and set the error bits in the SEC_MON.
+ */
+void fsl_secboot_handle_error(int error)
+{
+ const struct fsl_secboot_errcode *e;
+
+ for (e = fsl_secboot_errcodes; e->errcode != ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_MAX;
+ e++) {
+ if (e->errcode == error)
+ printf("ERROR :: %x :: %s\n", error, e->name);
+ }
+
+ switch (error) {
+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_BARKER:
+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_IMG_SIZE:
+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_LEN:
+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_SIG_LEN:
+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_LEN_NOT_TWICE_SIG_LEN:
+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_MOD_1:
+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_MOD_2:
+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_SIG_KEY_MOD:
+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_SG_ESBC_EP:
+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_SG_ENTIRES_BAD:
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_REVOCATION
+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_REVOKED:
+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INVALID_SRK_NUM_ENTRY:
+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INVALID_KEY_NUM:
+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INV_SRK_ENTRY_KEYLEN:
+#endif
+#if defined(CONFIG_FSL_ISBC_KEY_EXT)
+ /*@fallthrough@*/
+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_IE_KEY_REVOKED:
+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INVALID_IE_NUM_ENTRY:
+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INVALID_IE_KEY_NUM:
+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INV_IE_ENTRY_KEYLEN:
+ case ERROR_IE_TABLE_NOT_FOUND:
+#endif
+ fsl_secboot_header_verification_failure();
+ break;
+ case ERROR_ESBC_SEC_RESET:
+ case ERROR_ESBC_SEC_DEQ:
+ case ERROR_ESBC_SEC_ENQ:
+ case ERROR_ESBC_SEC_DEQ_TO:
+ case ERROR_ESBC_SEC_JOBQ_STATUS:
+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HASH_COMPARE_KEY:
+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HASH_COMPARE_EM:
+ fsl_secboot_image_verification_failure();
+ break;
+ case ERROR_ESBC_MISSING_BOOTM:
+ fsl_secboot_bootscript_parse_failure();
+ break;
+ case ERROR_ESBC_WRONG_CMD:
+ default:
+ branch_to_self();
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+static void fsl_secblk_handle_error(int error)
+{
+ switch (error) {
+ case ERROR_ESBC_SEC_ENQ:
+ fsl_secboot_handle_error(ERROR_ESBC_SEC_ENQ);
+ break;
+ case ERROR_ESBC_SEC_DEQ:
+ fsl_secboot_handle_error(ERROR_ESBC_SEC_DEQ);
+ break;
+ case ERROR_ESBC_SEC_DEQ_TO:
+ fsl_secboot_handle_error(ERROR_ESBC_SEC_DEQ_TO);
+ break;
+ default:
+ printf("Job Queue Output status %x\n", error);
+ fsl_secboot_handle_error(ERROR_ESBC_SEC_JOBQ_STATUS);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate hash of key obtained via offset present in ESBC uboot
+ * client hdr. This function calculates the hash of key which is obtained
+ * through offset present in ESBC uboot client header.
+ */
+static int calc_img_key_hash(struct fsl_secboot_img_priv *img)
+{
+ struct hash_algo *algo;
+ void *ctx;
+ int i, srk = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+ const char *algo_name = "sha256";
+
+ /* Calculate hash of the esbc key */
+ ret = hash_progressive_lookup_algo(algo_name, &algo);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = algo->hash_init(algo, &ctx);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* Update hash for ESBC key */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_REVOCATION
+ if (check_srk(img)) {
+ ret = algo->hash_update(algo, ctx,
+ (u8 *)(img->ehdrloc + img->hdr.srk_tbl_off),
+ img->hdr.len_kr.num_srk * sizeof(struct srk_table), 1);
+ srk = 1;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (!srk)
+ ret = algo->hash_update(algo, ctx,
+ img->img_key, img->key_len, 1);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* Copy hash at destination buffer */
+ ret = algo->hash_finish(algo, ctx, hash_val, algo->digest_size);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SHA256_BYTES; i++)
+ img->img_key_hash[i] = hash_val[i];
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate hash of ESBC hdr and ESBC. This function calculates the
+ * single hash of ESBC header and ESBC image. If SG flag is on, all
+ * SG entries are also hashed alongwith the complete SG table.
+ */
+static int calc_esbchdr_esbc_hash(struct fsl_secboot_img_priv *img)
+{
+ struct hash_algo *algo;
+ void *ctx;
+ int ret = 0;
+ int key_hash = 0;
+ const char *algo_name = "sha256";
+
+ /* Calculate the hash of the ESBC */
+ ret = hash_progressive_lookup_algo(algo_name, &algo);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = algo->hash_init(algo, &ctx);
+ /* Copy hash at destination buffer */
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* Update hash for CSF Header */
+ ret = algo->hash_update(algo, ctx,
+ (u8 *)&img->hdr, sizeof(struct fsl_secboot_img_hdr), 0);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* Update the hash with that of srk table if srk flag is 1
+ * If IE Table is selected, key is not added in the hash
+ * If neither srk table nor IE key table available, add key
+ * from header in the hash calculation
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_REVOCATION
+ if (check_srk(img)) {
+ ret = algo->hash_update(algo, ctx,
+ (u8 *)(img->ehdrloc + img->hdr.srk_tbl_off),
+ img->hdr.len_kr.num_srk * sizeof(struct srk_table), 0);
+ key_hash = 1;
+ }
+#endif
+#if defined(CONFIG_FSL_ISBC_KEY_EXT)
+ if (!key_hash && check_ie(img))
+ key_hash = 1;
+#endif
+ if (!key_hash)
+ ret = algo->hash_update(algo, ctx,
+ img->img_key, img->hdr.key_len, 0);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* Update hash for actual Image */
+ ret = algo->hash_update(algo, ctx,
+ (u8 *)img->hdr.pimg, img->hdr.img_size, 1);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* Copy hash at destination buffer */
+ ret = algo->hash_finish(algo, ctx, hash_val, algo->digest_size);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct encoded hash EM' wrt PKCSv1.5. This function calculates the
+ * pointers for padding, DER value and hash. And finally, constructs EM'
+ * which includes hash of complete CSF header and ESBC image. If SG flag
+ * is on, hash of SG table and entries is also included.
+ */
+static void construct_img_encoded_hash_second(struct fsl_secboot_img_priv *img)
+{
+ /*
+ * RSA PKCSv1.5 encoding format for encoded message is below
+ * EM = 0x0 || 0x1 || PS || 0x0 || DER || Hash
+ * PS is Padding String
+ * DER is DER value for SHA-256
+ * Hash is SHA-256 hash
+ * *********************************************************
+ * representative points to first byte of EM initially and is
+ * filled with 0x0
+ * representative is incremented by 1 and second byte is filled
+ * with 0x1
+ * padding points to third byte of EM
+ * digest points to full length of EM - 32 bytes
+ * hash_id (DER value) points to 19 bytes before pDigest
+ * separator is one byte which separates padding and DER
+ */
+
+ size_t len;
+ u8 *representative;
+ u8 *padding, *digest;
+ u8 *hash_id, *separator;
+ int i;
+
+ len = (get_key_len(img) / 2) - 1;
+ representative = img->img_encoded_hash_second;
+ representative[0] = 0;
+ representative[1] = 1; /* block type 1 */
+
+ padding = &representative[2];
+ digest = &representative[1] + len - 32;
+ hash_id = digest - sizeof(hash_identifier);
+ separator = hash_id - 1;
+
+ /* fill padding area pointed by padding with 0xff */
+ memset(padding, 0xff, separator - padding);
+
+ /* fill byte pointed by separator */
+ *separator = 0;
+
+ /* fill SHA-256 DER value pointed by HashId */
+ memcpy(hash_id, hash_identifier, sizeof(hash_identifier));
+
+ /* fill hash pointed by Digest */
+ for (i = 0; i < SHA256_BYTES; i++)
+ digest[i] = hash_val[i];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reads and validates the ESBC client header.
+ * This function reads key and signature from the ESBC client header.
+ * If Scatter/Gather flag is on, lengths and offsets of images
+ * present as SG entries are also read. This function also checks
+ * whether the header is valid or not.
+ */
+static int read_validate_esbc_client_header(struct fsl_secboot_img_priv *img)
+{
+ char buf[20];
+ struct fsl_secboot_img_hdr *hdr = &img->hdr;
+ void *esbc = (u8 *)img->ehdrloc;
+ u8 *k, *s;
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_REVOCATION
+ u32 ret;
+ u32 key_num, key_revoc_flag, size;
+#endif
+#if defined(CONFIG_FSL_ISBC_KEY_EXT)
+ struct ie_key_info *ie_info;
+ u32 ie_num, ie_revoc_flag, ie_key_len;
+#endif
+ int key_found = 0;
+
+ /* check barker code */
+ if (memcmp(hdr->barker, barker_code, ESBC_BARKER_LEN))
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_BARKER;
+
+ sprintf(buf, "%p", hdr->pimg);
+ setenv("img_addr", buf);
+
+ if (!hdr->img_size)
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_IMG_SIZE;
+
+ /* Key checking*/
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_REVOCATION
+ if (check_srk(img)) {
+ if ((hdr->len_kr.num_srk == 0) ||
+ (hdr->len_kr.num_srk > MAX_KEY_ENTRIES))
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INVALID_SRK_NUM_ENTRY;
+
+ key_num = hdr->len_kr.srk_sel;
+ if (key_num == 0 || key_num > hdr->len_kr.num_srk)
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INVALID_KEY_NUM;
+
+ /* Get revoc key from sfp */
+ key_revoc_flag = get_key_revoc();
+ ret = is_key_revoked(key_num, key_revoc_flag);
+ if (ret)
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_REVOKED;
+
+ size = hdr->len_kr.num_srk * sizeof(struct srk_table);
+
+ memcpy(&img->srk_tbl, esbc + hdr->srk_tbl_off, size);
+
+ ret = validate_srk_tbl(img->srk_tbl, hdr->len_kr.num_srk);
+
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ img->key_len = img->srk_tbl[key_num - 1].key_len;
+
+ memcpy(&img->img_key, &(img->srk_tbl[key_num - 1].pkey),
+ img->key_len);
+
+ key_found = 1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_FSL_ISBC_KEY_EXT)
+ if (!key_found && check_ie(img)) {
+ if (get_ie_info_addr(&img->ie_addr))
+ return ERROR_IE_TABLE_NOT_FOUND;
+ ie_info = (struct ie_key_info *)img->ie_addr;
+ if (ie_info->num_keys == 0 || ie_info->num_keys > 32)
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INVALID_IE_NUM_ENTRY;
+
+ ie_num = hdr->ie_key_sel;
+ if (ie_num == 0 || ie_num > ie_info->num_keys)
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INVALID_IE_KEY_NUM;
+
+ ie_revoc_flag = ie_info->key_revok;
+ if ((u32)(1 << (ie_num - 1)) & ie_revoc_flag)
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_IE_KEY_REVOKED;
+
+ ie_key_len = ie_info->ie_key_tbl[ie_num - 1].key_len;
+
+ if (!((ie_key_len == 2 * KEY_SIZE_BYTES / 4) ||
+ (ie_key_len == 2 * KEY_SIZE_BYTES / 2) ||
+ (ie_key_len == 2 * KEY_SIZE_BYTES)))
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INV_IE_ENTRY_KEYLEN;
+
+ memcpy(&img->img_key, &(ie_info->ie_key_tbl[ie_num - 1].pkey),
+ ie_key_len);
+
+ img->key_len = ie_key_len;
+ key_found = 1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (key_found == 0) {
+ /* check key length */
+ if (!((hdr->key_len == 2 * KEY_SIZE_BYTES / 4) ||
+ (hdr->key_len == 2 * KEY_SIZE_BYTES / 2) ||
+ (hdr->key_len == 2 * KEY_SIZE_BYTES)))
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_LEN;
+
+ memcpy(&img->img_key, esbc + hdr->pkey, hdr->key_len);
+
+ img->key_len = hdr->key_len;
+
+ key_found = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* check signaure */
+ if (get_key_len(img) == 2 * hdr->sign_len) {
+ /* check signature length */
+ if (!((hdr->sign_len == KEY_SIZE_BYTES / 4) ||
+ (hdr->sign_len == KEY_SIZE_BYTES / 2) ||
+ (hdr->sign_len == KEY_SIZE_BYTES)))
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_SIG_LEN;
+ } else {
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_LEN_NOT_TWICE_SIG_LEN;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(&img->img_sign, esbc + hdr->psign, hdr->sign_len);
+
+ /* No SG support */
+ if (hdr->sg_flag)
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_SG;
+
+ /* modulus most significant bit should be set */
+ k = (u8 *)&img->img_key;
+
+ if ((k[0] & 0x80) == 0)
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_MOD_1;
+
+ /* modulus value should be odd */
+ if ((k[get_key_len(img) / 2 - 1] & 0x1) == 0)
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_MOD_2;
+
+ /* Check signature value < modulus value */
+ s = (u8 *)&img->img_sign;
+
+ if (!(memcmp(s, k, hdr->sign_len) < 0))
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_SIG_KEY_MOD;
+
+ return ESBC_VALID_HDR;
+}
+
+static inline int str2longbe(const char *p, ulong *num)
+{
+ char *endptr;
+ ulong tmp;
+
+ if (!p) {
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ tmp = simple_strtoul(p, &endptr, 16);
+ if (sizeof(ulong) == 4)
+ *num = cpu_to_be32(tmp);
+ else
+ *num = cpu_to_be64(tmp);
+ }
+
+ return *p != '\0' && *endptr == '\0';
+}
+
+int fsl_secboot_validate(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
+ char * const argv[])
+{
+ struct ccsr_sfp_regs *sfp_regs = (void *)(CONFIG_SYS_SFP_ADDR);
+ ulong hash[SHA256_BYTES/sizeof(ulong)];
+ char hash_str[NUM_HEX_CHARS + 1];
+ ulong addr = simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 16);
+ struct fsl_secboot_img_priv *img;
+ struct fsl_secboot_img_hdr *hdr;
+ void *esbc;
+ int ret, i, hash_cmd = 0;
+ u32 srk_hash[8];
+ uint32_t key_len;
+ struct key_prop prop;
+#if !defined(USE_HOSTCC)
+ struct udevice *mod_exp_dev;
+#endif
+
+ if (argc == 3) {
+ char *cp = argv[2];
+ int i = 0;
+
+ if (*cp == '0' && *(cp + 1) == 'x')
+ cp += 2;
+
+ /* The input string expected is in hex, where
+ * each 4 bits would be represented by a hex
+ * sha256 hash is 256 bits long, which would mean
+ * num of characters = 256 / 4
+ */
+ if (strlen(cp) != SHA256_NIBBLES) {
+ printf("%s is not a 256 bits hex string as expected\n",
+ argv[2]);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(hash)/sizeof(ulong); i++) {
+ strncpy(hash_str, cp + (i * NUM_HEX_CHARS),
+ NUM_HEX_CHARS);
+ hash_str[NUM_HEX_CHARS] = '\0';
+ if (!str2longbe(hash_str, &hash[i])) {
+ printf("%s is not a 256 bits hex string ",
+ argv[2]);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ hash_cmd = 1;
+ }
+
+ img = malloc(sizeof(struct fsl_secboot_img_priv));
+
+ if (!img)
+ return -1;
+
+ memset(img, 0, sizeof(struct fsl_secboot_img_priv));
+
+ hdr = &img->hdr;
+ img->ehdrloc = addr;
+ esbc = (u8 *)img->ehdrloc;
+
+ memcpy(hdr, esbc, sizeof(struct fsl_secboot_img_hdr));
+
+ /* read and validate esbc header */
+ ret = read_validate_esbc_client_header(img);
+
+ if (ret != ESBC_VALID_HDR) {
+ fsl_secboot_handle_error(ret);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /* SRKH present in SFP */
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_SRKH_REGS; i++)
+ srk_hash[i] = srk_in32(&sfp_regs->srk_hash[i]);
+
+ /*
+ * Calculate hash of key obtained via offset present in
+ * ESBC uboot client hdr
+ */
+ ret = calc_img_key_hash(img);
+ if (ret) {
+ fsl_secblk_handle_error(ret);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /* Compare hash obtained above with SRK hash present in SFP */
+ if (hash_cmd)
+ ret = memcmp(&hash, &img->img_key_hash, SHA256_BYTES);
+ else
+ ret = memcmp(srk_hash, img->img_key_hash, SHA256_BYTES);
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_FSL_ISBC_KEY_EXT)
+ if (!hash_cmd && check_ie(img))
+ ret = 0;
+#endif
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ fsl_secboot_handle_error(ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HASH_COMPARE_KEY);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ ret = calc_esbchdr_esbc_hash(img);
+ if (ret) {
+ fsl_secblk_handle_error(ret);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /* Construct encoded hash EM' wrt PKCSv1.5 */
+ construct_img_encoded_hash_second(img);
+
+ /* Fill prop structure for public key */
+ memset(&prop, 0, sizeof(struct key_prop));
+ key_len = get_key_len(img) / 2;
+ prop.modulus = img->img_key;
+ prop.public_exponent = img->img_key + key_len;
+ prop.num_bits = key_len * 8;
+ prop.exp_len = key_len;
+
+ ret = uclass_get_device(UCLASS_MOD_EXP, 0, &mod_exp_dev);
+ if (ret) {
+ printf("RSA: Can't find Modular Exp implementation\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ ret = rsa_mod_exp(mod_exp_dev, img->img_sign, img->hdr.sign_len,
+ &prop, img->img_encoded_hash);
+ if (ret) {
+ fsl_secblk_handle_error(ret);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * compare the encoded messages EM' and EM wrt RSA PKCSv1.5
+ * memcmp returns zero on success
+ * memcmp returns non-zero on failure
+ */
+ ret = memcmp(&img->img_encoded_hash_second, &img->img_encoded_hash,
+ img->hdr.sign_len);
+
+ if (ret) {
+ fsl_secboot_handle_error(ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HASH_COMPARE_EM);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ printf("esbc_validate command successful\n");
+
+exit:
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/doc/README.esbc_validate b/doc/README.esbc_validate
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..864520a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/README.esbc_validate
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+/*
+ * (C) Copyright 2014
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+ */
+
+esbc_validate command
+========================================
+
+1. esbc_validate command is meant for validating header and
+ signature of images (Boot Script and ESBC uboot client).
+ SHA-256 and RSA operations are performed using SEC block in HW.
+ This command works on both PBL based and Non PBL based Freescale
+ platforms.
+ Command usage:
+ esbc_validate img_hdr_addr [pub_key_hash]
+ esbc_validate hdr_addr <hash_val>
+ Validates signature using RSA verification.
+ $hdr_addr Address of header of the image to be validated.
+ $hash_val -Optional. It provides Hash of public/srk key to be
+ used to verify signature.
+
+2. ESBC uboot client can be linux. Additionally, rootfs and device
+ tree blob can also be signed.
+3. In the event of header or signature failure in validation,
+ ITS and ITF bits determine further course of action.
+4. In case of soft failure, appropriate error is dumped on console.
+5. In case of hard failure, SoC is issued RESET REQUEST after
+ dumping error on the console.
+6. KEY REVOCATION Feature:
+ QorIQ platforms like B4/T4 have support of srk key table and key
+ revocation in ISBC code in Silicon.
+ The srk key table allows the user to have a key table with multiple
+ keys and revoke any key in case of particular key gets compromised.
+ In case the ISBC code uses the key revocation and srk key table to
+ verify the u-boot code, the subsequent chain of trust should also
+ use the same.
+6. ISBC KEY EXTENSION Feature:
+ This feature allows large number of keys to be used for esbc validation
+ of images. A set of public keys is being signed and validated by ISBC
+ which can be further used for esbc validation of images.
diff --git a/include/fsl_secboot_err.h b/include/fsl_secboot_err.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1590ead
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/fsl_secboot_err.h
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2010-2012 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+ */
+
+#ifndef _FSL_SECBOOT_ERR_H
+#define _FSL_SECBOOT_ERR_H
+
+#define ERROR_ESBC_PAMU_INIT 0x100000
+#define ERROR_ESBC_SEC_RESET 0x200000
+#define ERROR_ESBC_SEC_INIT 0x400000
+#define ERROR_ESBC_SEC_DEQ 0x800000
+#define ERROR_ESBC_SEC_DEQ_TO 0x1000000
+#define ERROR_ESBC_SEC_ENQ 0x2000000
+#define ERROR_ESBC_SEC_JOBQ_STATUS 0x4000000
+#define ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_CPUID_NO_MATCH 0x1
+#define ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HDR_LOC 0x2
+#define ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_BARKER 0x4
+#define ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_LEN 0x8
+#define ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_SIG_LEN 0x10
+#define ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_REVOKED 0x11
+#define ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INVALID_SRK_NUM_ENTRY 0x12
+#define ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INVALID_KEY_NUM 0x13
+#define ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INV_SRK_ENTRY_KEYLEN 0x14
+#define ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_IE_KEY_REVOKED 0x15
+#define ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INVALID_IE_NUM_ENTRY 0x16
+#define ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INVALID_IE_KEY_NUM 0x17
+#define ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INV_IE_ENTRY_KEYLEN 0x18
+#define ERROR_IE_TABLE_NOT_FOUND 0x19
+#define ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_LEN_NOT_TWICE_SIG_LEN 0x20
+#define ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_MOD_1 0x40
+#define ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_MOD_2 0x80
+#define ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_SIG_KEY_MOD 0x100
+#define ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_SG_ESBC_EP 0x200
+#define ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HASH_COMPARE_KEY 0x400
+#define ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HASH_COMPARE_EM 0x800
+#define ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_SSM_TRUSTSTS 0x1000
+#define ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_BAD_ADDRESS 0x2000
+#define ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_MISC 0x4000
+#define ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_SG_ENTIRES_BAD 0x8000
+#define ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_SG 0x10000
+#define ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_IMG_SIZE 0x20000
+#define ERROR_ESBC_WRONG_CMD 0x40000
+#define ERROR_ESBC_MISSING_BOOTM 0x80000
+#define ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_MAX 0x0
+
+struct fsl_secboot_errcode {
+ int errcode;
+ const char *name;
+};
+
+static const struct fsl_secboot_errcode fsl_secboot_errcodes[] = {
+ { ERROR_ESBC_PAMU_INIT,
+ "Error in initializing PAMU"},
+ { ERROR_ESBC_SEC_RESET,
+ "Error in resetting Job ring of SEC"},
+ { ERROR_ESBC_SEC_INIT,
+ "Error in initializing SEC"},
+ { ERROR_ESBC_SEC_ENQ,
+ "Error in enqueue operation by SEC"},
+ { ERROR_ESBC_SEC_DEQ_TO,
+ "Dequeue operation by SEC is timed out"},
+ { ERROR_ESBC_SEC_DEQ,
+ "Error in dequeue operation by SEC"},
+ { ERROR_ESBC_SEC_JOBQ_STATUS,
+ "Error in status of the job submitted to SEC"},
+ { ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_CPUID_NO_MATCH,
+ "Current core is not boot core i.e core0" },
+ { ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HDR_LOC,
+ "Header address not in allowed memory range" },
+ { ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_BARKER,
+ "Wrong barker code in header" },
+ { ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_LEN,
+ "Wrong public key length in header" },
+ { ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_SIG_LEN,
+ "Wrong signature length in header" },
+ { ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_LEN_NOT_TWICE_SIG_LEN,
+ "Public key length not twice of signature length" },
+ { ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_MOD_1,
+ "Public key Modulus most significant bit not set" },
+ { ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_MOD_2,
+ "Public key Modulus in header not odd" },
+ { ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_SIG_KEY_MOD,
+ "Signature not less than modulus" },
+ { ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_SG_ESBC_EP,
+ "Entry point not in allowed space or one of the SG entries" },
+ { ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HASH_COMPARE_KEY,
+ "Public key hash comparison failed" },
+ { ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HASH_COMPARE_EM,
+ "RSA verification failed" },
+ { ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_SSM_TRUSTSTS,
+ "SNVS not in TRUSTED state" },
+ { ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_BAD_ADDRESS,
+ "Bad address error" },
+ { ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_MISC,
+ "Miscallaneous error" },
+ { ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_SG,
+ "No SG support" },
+ { ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_IMG_SIZE,
+ "Invalid Image size" },
+ { ERROR_ESBC_WRONG_CMD,
+ "Unknown cmd/Wrong arguments. Core in infinite loop"},
+ { ERROR_ESBC_MISSING_BOOTM,
+ "Bootm command missing from bootscript" },
+ { ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_REVOKED,
+ "Selected key is revoked" },
+ { ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INVALID_SRK_NUM_ENTRY,
+ "Wrong key entry" },
+ { ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INVALID_KEY_NUM,
+ "Wrong key is selected" },
+ { ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INV_SRK_ENTRY_KEYLEN,
+ "Wrong srk public key len in header" },
+ { ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_IE_KEY_REVOKED,
+ "Selected IE key is revoked" },
+ { ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INVALID_IE_NUM_ENTRY,
+ "Wrong key entry in IE Table" },
+ { ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INVALID_IE_KEY_NUM,
+ "Wrong IE key is selected" },
+ { ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INV_IE_ENTRY_KEYLEN,
+ "Wrong IE public key len in header" },
+ { ERROR_IE_TABLE_NOT_FOUND,
+ "Information about IE Table missing" },
+ { ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_MAX, "NULL" }
+};
+
+void fsl_secboot_handle_error(int error);
+#endif
diff --git a/include/fsl_validate.h b/include/fsl_validate.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5234fd7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/fsl_validate.h
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2010-2012 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+ */
+
+#ifndef _FSL_VALIDATE_H_
+#define _FSL_VALIDATE_H_
+
+#include <fsl_sec.h>
+#include <fsl_sec_mon.h>
+#include <command.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#define WORD_SIZE 4
+
+/* Minimum and maximum size of RSA signature length in bits */
+#define KEY_SIZE 4096
+#define KEY_SIZE_BYTES (KEY_SIZE/8)
+#define KEY_SIZE_WORDS (KEY_SIZE_BYTES/(WORD_SIZE))
+
+extern struct jobring jr;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_REVOCATION
+/* Srk table and key revocation check */
+#define SRK_FLAG 0x01
+#define UNREVOCABLE_KEY 4
+#define ALIGN_REVOC_KEY 3
+#define MAX_KEY_ENTRIES 4
+#endif
+
+/* Barker code size in bytes */
+#define ESBC_BARKER_LEN 4 /* barker code length in ESBC uboot client */
+ /* header */
+
+/* No-error return values */
+#define ESBC_VALID_HDR 0 /* header is valid */
+
+/* Maximum number of SG entries allowed */
+#define MAX_SG_ENTRIES 8
+
+/*
+ * ESBC uboot client header structure.
+ * The struct contain the following fields
+ * barker code
+ * public key offset
+ * pub key length
+ * signature offset
+ * length of the signature
+ * ptr to SG table
+ * no of entries in SG table
+ * esbc ptr
+ * size of esbc
+ * esbc entry point
+ * Scatter gather flag
+ * UID flag
+ * FSL UID
+ * OEM UID
+ * Here, pub key is modulus concatenated with exponent
+ * of equal length
+ */
+struct fsl_secboot_img_hdr {
+ u8 barker[ESBC_BARKER_LEN]; /* barker code */
+ union {
+ u32 pkey; /* public key offset */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_REVOCATION
+ u32 srk_tbl_off;
+#endif
+ };
+
+ union {
+ u32 key_len; /* pub key length in bytes */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_REVOCATION
+ struct {
+ u32 srk_table_flag:8;
+ u32 srk_sel:8;
+ u32 num_srk:16;
+ } len_kr;
+#endif
+ };
+
+ u32 psign; /* signature offset */
+ u32 sign_len; /* length of the signature in bytes */
+ union {
+ struct fsl_secboot_sg_table *psgtable; /* ptr to SG table */
+ u8 *pimg; /* ptr to ESBC client image */
+ };
+ union {
+ u32 sg_entries; /* no of entries in SG table */
+ u32 img_size; /* ESBC client image size in bytes */
+ };
+ ulong img_start; /* ESBC client entry point */
+ u32 sg_flag; /* Scatter gather flag */
+ u32 uid_flag;
+ u32 fsl_uid_0;
+ u32 oem_uid_0;
+ u32 reserved1[2];
+ u32 fsl_uid_1;
+ u32 oem_uid_1;
+ u32 reserved2[2];
+ u32 ie_flag;
+ u32 ie_key_sel;
+};
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_FSL_ISBC_KEY_EXT)
+struct ie_key_table {
+ u32 key_len;
+ u8 pkey[2 * KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
+};
+
+struct ie_key_info {
+ uint32_t key_revok;
+ uint32_t num_keys;
+ struct ie_key_table ie_key_tbl[32];
+};
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_REVOCATION
+struct srk_table {
+ u32 key_len;
+ u8 pkey[2 * KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
+};
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * SG table.
+ */
+#if defined(CONFIG_FSL_TRUST_ARCH_v1) && defined(CONFIG_FSL_CORENET)
+/*
+ * This struct contains the following fields
+ * length of the segment
+ * source address
+ */
+struct fsl_secboot_sg_table {
+ u32 len; /* length of the segment in bytes */
+ ulong src_addr; /* ptr to the data segment */
+};
+#else
+/*
+ * This struct contains the following fields
+ * length of the segment
+ * Destination Target ID
+ * source address
+ * destination address
+ */
+struct fsl_secboot_sg_table {
+ u32 len;
+ u32 trgt_id;
+ ulong src_addr;
+ ulong dst_addr;
+};
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * ESBC private structure.
+ * Private structure used by ESBC to store following fields
+ * ESBC client key
+ * ESBC client key hash
+ * ESBC client Signature
+ * Encoded hash recovered from signature
+ * Encoded hash of ESBC client header plus ESBC client image
+ */
+struct fsl_secboot_img_priv {
+ uint32_t hdr_location;
+ ulong ie_addr;
+ u32 key_len;
+ struct fsl_secboot_img_hdr hdr;
+
+ u8 img_key[2 * KEY_SIZE_BYTES]; /* ESBC client key */
+ u8 img_key_hash[32]; /* ESBC client key hash */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_REVOCATION
+ struct srk_table srk_tbl[MAX_KEY_ENTRIES];
+#endif
+ u8 img_sign[KEY_SIZE_BYTES]; /* ESBC client signature */
+
+ u8 img_encoded_hash[KEY_SIZE_BYTES]; /* EM wrt RSA PKCSv1.5 */
+ /* Includes hash recovered after
+ * signature verification
+ */
+
+ u8 img_encoded_hash_second[KEY_SIZE_BYTES];/* EM' wrt RSA PKCSv1.5 */
+ /* Includes hash of
+ * ESBC client header plus
+ * ESBC client image
+ */
+
+ struct fsl_secboot_sg_table sgtbl[MAX_SG_ENTRIES]; /* SG table */
+ u32 ehdrloc; /* ESBC client location */
+};
+
+int fsl_secboot_validate(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
+ char * const argv[]);
+int fsl_secboot_blob_encap(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
+ char * const argv[]);
+int fsl_secboot_blob_decap(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
+ char * const argv[]);
+
+#endif
--
1.8.1.4
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