[U-Boot] [PATCH] fit: Verify all configuration signatures

[Marek Vasut]

Rather than verifying configuration signature of the configuration node
containing the kernel image types, verify all configuration nodes, even
those that do not contain kernel images. This is useful when the nodes
contain ie. standalone OSes or U-Boot.

Signed-off-by: Marek Vasut <marex at denx.de>
Cc: Tom Rini <trini at konsulko.com>
Cc: Pantelis Antoniou <pantelis.antoniou at konsulko.com>
Cc: Simon Glass <sjg at chromium.org>
---
 common/image-fit.c | 26 ++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/common/image-fit.c b/common/image-fit.c
index 728187ac88..8d39a243f8 100644
--- a/common/image-fit.c
+++ b/common/image-fit.c
@@ -1838,24 +1838,26 @@ int fit_image_load(bootm_headers_t *images, ulong addr,
 					BOOTSTAGE_SUB_NO_UNIT_NAME);
 			return -ENOENT;
 		}
+
 		fit_base_uname_config = fdt_get_name(fit, cfg_noffset, NULL);
 		printf("   Using '%s' configuration\n", fit_base_uname_config);
-		if (image_type == IH_TYPE_KERNEL) {
-			/* Remember (and possibly verify) this config */
+		/* Remember this config */
+		if (image_type == IH_TYPE_KERNEL)
 			images->fit_uname_cfg = fit_base_uname_config;
-			if (IMAGE_ENABLE_VERIFY && images->verify) {
-				puts("   Verifying Hash Integrity ... ");
-				if (fit_config_verify(fit, cfg_noffset)) {
-					puts("Bad Data Hash\n");
-					bootstage_error(bootstage_id +
-						BOOTSTAGE_SUB_HASH);
-					return -EACCES;
-				}
-				puts("OK\n");
+
+		if (IMAGE_ENABLE_VERIFY && images->verify) {
+			puts("   Verifying Hash Integrity ... ");
+			if (fit_config_verify(fit, cfg_noffset)) {
+				puts("Bad Data Hash\n");
+				bootstage_error(bootstage_id +
+					BOOTSTAGE_SUB_HASH);
+				return -EACCES;
 			}
-			bootstage_mark(BOOTSTAGE_ID_FIT_CONFIG);
+			puts("OK\n");
 		}
 
+		bootstage_mark(BOOTSTAGE_ID_FIT_CONFIG);
+
 		noffset = fit_conf_get_prop_node(fit, cfg_noffset,
 						 prop_name);
 		fit_uname = fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL);
-- 
2.16.2