[U-Boot] [U-Boot, 1/2] image-sig: Ensure that hashed-nodes is null-terminated

[Tom Rini]

On Wed, Nov 07, 2018 at 02:51:45PM -0500, Tom Rini wrote:

> From: Konrad Beckmann <konrad.beckmann at gmail.com>
> 
> A specially crafted FIT image leads to memory corruption in the stack
> when using the verified boot feature. The function fit_config_check_sig
> has a logic error that makes it possible to write past the end of the
> stack allocated array node_inc. This could potentially be used to bypass
> the signature check when using verified boot.
> 
> This change ensures that the number of strings is correct when counted.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Konrad Beckmann <konrad.beckmann at gmail.com>
> Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg at chromium.org>

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

-- 
Tom
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