[PATCH v5 1/3] tools: mkimage: Add Allwinner TOC0 support
Samuel Holland
samuel at sholland.org
Fri Mar 18 06:00:43 CET 2022
Most Allwinner sunxi SoCs have separate boot ROMs in non-secure and
secure mode. The "non-secure" or "normal" boot ROM (NBROM) uses the
existing sunxi_egon image type. The secure boot ROM (SBROM) uses a
completely different image type, known as TOC0.
A TOC0 image is composed of a header and two or more items. One item
is the firmware binary. The others form a chain linking the firmware
signature to the root-of-trust public key (ROTPK), which has its hash
burned in the SoC's eFuses. Signatures are made using RSA-2048 + SHA256.
The pseudo-ASN.1 structure is manually assembled; this is done to work
around bugs/quirks in the boot ROM, which vary between SoCs. This TOC0
implementation has been verified to work with the A50, A64, H5, H6,
and H616 SBROMs, and it may work with other SoCs.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel at sholland.org>
---
(no changes since v3)
Changes in v3:
- Removed TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO selection for sunxi, since most boards
do not need it
- Added __packed to all new "ABI" structs
- Added entry to MAINTAINERS for sunxi tools
Changes in v2:
- Moved certificate and key item structures out of sunxi_image.h
- Renamed "main" and "item" variables for clarity
- Improved error messages, and added a hint about key generation
- Added a comment explaining the purpose of the various key files
- Mentioned testing this code on A50 in the commit message
MAINTAINERS | 1 +
boot/image.c | 1 +
include/image.h | 1 +
include/sunxi_image.h | 37 ++
tools/Makefile | 7 +-
tools/sunxi_toc0.c | 907 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
6 files changed, 951 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tools/sunxi_toc0.c
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 8defd09a64..350746005b 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -517,6 +517,7 @@ F: board/sunxi/
F: drivers/clk/sunxi/
F: drivers/phy/allwinner/
F: drivers/video/sunxi/
+F: tools/sunxi*
ARM TEGRA
M: Tom Warren <twarren at nvidia.com>
diff --git a/boot/image.c b/boot/image.c
index 07fa2d3160..4bd5e26978 100644
--- a/boot/image.c
+++ b/boot/image.c
@@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ static const table_entry_t uimage_type[] = {
{ IH_TYPE_MTKIMAGE, "mtk_image", "MediaTek BootROM loadable Image" },
{ IH_TYPE_COPRO, "copro", "Coprocessor Image"},
{ IH_TYPE_SUNXI_EGON, "sunxi_egon", "Allwinner eGON Boot Image" },
+ { IH_TYPE_SUNXI_TOC0, "sunxi_toc0", "Allwinner TOC0 Boot Image" },
{ -1, "", "", },
};
diff --git a/include/image.h b/include/image.h
index 97e5f2eb24..720737f633 100644
--- a/include/image.h
+++ b/include/image.h
@@ -227,6 +227,7 @@ enum {
IH_TYPE_IMX8IMAGE, /* Freescale IMX8Boot Image */
IH_TYPE_COPRO, /* Coprocessor Image for remoteproc*/
IH_TYPE_SUNXI_EGON, /* Allwinner eGON Boot Image */
+ IH_TYPE_SUNXI_TOC0, /* Allwinner TOC0 Boot Image */
IH_TYPE_COUNT, /* Number of image types */
};
diff --git a/include/sunxi_image.h b/include/sunxi_image.h
index 5b2055c0af..379ca9196e 100644
--- a/include/sunxi_image.h
+++ b/include/sunxi_image.h
@@ -9,9 +9,13 @@
*
* Shared between mkimage and the SPL.
*/
+
#ifndef SUNXI_IMAGE_H
#define SUNXI_IMAGE_H
+#include <linux/compiler_attributes.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
#define BOOT0_MAGIC "eGON.BT0"
#define BROM_STAMP_VALUE 0x5f0a6c39
#define SPL_SIGNATURE "SPL" /* marks "sunxi" SPL header */
@@ -79,4 +83,37 @@ struct boot_file_head {
/* Compile time check to assure proper alignment of structure */
typedef char boot_file_head_not_multiple_of_32[1 - 2*(sizeof(struct boot_file_head) % 32)];
+struct __packed toc0_main_info {
+ uint8_t name[8];
+ __le32 magic;
+ __le32 checksum;
+ __le32 serial;
+ __le32 status;
+ __le32 num_items;
+ __le32 length;
+ uint8_t platform[4];
+ uint8_t reserved[8];
+ uint8_t end[4];
+};
+
+#define TOC0_MAIN_INFO_NAME "TOC0.GLH"
+#define TOC0_MAIN_INFO_MAGIC 0x89119800
+#define TOC0_MAIN_INFO_END "MIE;"
+
+struct __packed toc0_item_info {
+ __le32 name;
+ __le32 offset;
+ __le32 length;
+ __le32 status;
+ __le32 type;
+ __le32 load_addr;
+ uint8_t reserved[4];
+ uint8_t end[4];
+};
+
+#define TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_CERT 0x00010101
+#define TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_FIRMWARE 0x00010202
+#define TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_KEY 0x00010303
+#define TOC0_ITEM_INFO_END "IIE;"
+
#endif
diff --git a/tools/Makefile b/tools/Makefile
index 60231c728c..e17271be8b 100644
--- a/tools/Makefile
+++ b/tools/Makefile
@@ -94,9 +94,10 @@ ECDSA_OBJS-$(CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO) := $(addprefix lib/ecdsa/, ecdsa-libcrypto.
AES_OBJS-$(CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO) := $(addprefix lib/aes/, \
aes-encrypt.o aes-decrypt.o)
-# Cryptographic helpers that depend on openssl/libcrypto
-LIBCRYPTO_OBJS-$(CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO) := $(addprefix lib/, \
- fdt-libcrypto.o)
+# Cryptographic helpers and image types that depend on openssl/libcrypto
+LIBCRYPTO_OBJS-$(CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO) := \
+ lib/fdt-libcrypto.o \
+ sunxi_toc0.o
ROCKCHIP_OBS = lib/rc4.o rkcommon.o rkimage.o rksd.o rkspi.o
diff --git a/tools/sunxi_toc0.c b/tools/sunxi_toc0.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..58a6e7a0a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/sunxi_toc0.c
@@ -0,0 +1,907 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * (C) Copyright 2018 Arm Ltd.
+ * (C) Copyright 2020-2021 Samuel Holland <samuel at sholland.org>
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+#include <image.h>
+#include <sunxi_image.h>
+
+#include "imagetool.h"
+#include "mkimage.h"
+
+/*
+ * NAND requires 8K padding. For other devices, BROM requires only
+ * 512B padding, but let's use the larger padding to cover everything.
+ */
+#define PAD_SIZE 8192
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "mkimage (TOC0): %s: " fmt
+#define pr_err(fmt, args...) fprintf(stderr, pr_fmt(fmt), "error", ##args)
+#define pr_warn(fmt, args...) fprintf(stderr, pr_fmt(fmt), "warning", ##args)
+#define pr_info(fmt, args...) fprintf(stderr, pr_fmt(fmt), "info", ##args)
+
+struct __packed toc0_key_item {
+ __le32 vendor_id;
+ __le32 key0_n_len;
+ __le32 key0_e_len;
+ __le32 key1_n_len;
+ __le32 key1_e_len;
+ __le32 sig_len;
+ uint8_t key0[512];
+ uint8_t key1[512];
+ uint8_t reserved[32];
+ uint8_t sig[256];
+};
+
+/*
+ * This looks somewhat like an X.509 certificate, but it is not valid BER.
+ *
+ * Some differences:
+ * - Some X.509 certificate fields are missing or rearranged.
+ * - Some sequences have the wrong tag.
+ * - Zero-length sequences are accepted.
+ * - Large strings and integers must be an even number of bytes long.
+ * - Positive integers are not zero-extended to maintain their sign.
+ *
+ * See https://linux-sunxi.org/TOC0 for more information.
+ */
+struct __packed toc0_small_tag {
+ uint8_t tag;
+ uint8_t length;
+};
+
+typedef struct toc0_small_tag toc0_small_int;
+typedef struct toc0_small_tag toc0_small_oct;
+typedef struct toc0_small_tag toc0_small_seq;
+typedef struct toc0_small_tag toc0_small_exp;
+
+#define TOC0_SMALL_INT(len) { 0x02, (len) }
+#define TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(len) { 0x30, (len) }
+#define TOC0_SMALL_EXP(tag, len) { 0xa0 | (tag), len }
+
+struct __packed toc0_large_tag {
+ uint8_t tag;
+ uint8_t prefix;
+ uint8_t length_hi;
+ uint8_t length_lo;
+};
+
+typedef struct toc0_large_tag toc0_large_int;
+typedef struct toc0_large_tag toc0_large_bit;
+typedef struct toc0_large_tag toc0_large_seq;
+
+#define TOC0_LARGE_INT(len) { 0x02, 0x82, (len) >> 8, (len) & 0xff }
+#define TOC0_LARGE_BIT(len) { 0x03, 0x82, (len) >> 8, (len) & 0xff }
+#define TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(len) { 0x30, 0x82, (len) >> 8, (len) & 0xff }
+
+struct __packed toc0_cert_item {
+ toc0_large_seq tag_totalSequence;
+ struct __packed toc0_totalSequence {
+ toc0_large_seq tag_mainSequence;
+ struct __packed toc0_mainSequence {
+ toc0_small_exp tag_explicit0;
+ struct __packed toc0_explicit0 {
+ toc0_small_int tag_version;
+ uint8_t version;
+ } explicit0;
+ toc0_small_int tag_serialNumber;
+ uint8_t serialNumber;
+ toc0_small_seq tag_signature;
+ toc0_small_seq tag_issuer;
+ toc0_small_seq tag_validity;
+ toc0_small_seq tag_subject;
+ toc0_large_seq tag_subjectPublicKeyInfo;
+ struct __packed toc0_subjectPublicKeyInfo {
+ toc0_small_seq tag_algorithm;
+ toc0_large_seq tag_publicKey;
+ struct __packed toc0_publicKey {
+ toc0_large_int tag_n;
+ uint8_t n[256];
+ toc0_small_int tag_e;
+ uint8_t e[3];
+ } publicKey;
+ } subjectPublicKeyInfo;
+ toc0_small_exp tag_explicit3;
+ struct __packed toc0_explicit3 {
+ toc0_small_seq tag_extension;
+ struct __packed toc0_extension {
+ toc0_small_int tag_digest;
+ uint8_t digest[32];
+ } extension;
+ } explicit3;
+ } mainSequence;
+ toc0_large_bit tag_sigSequence;
+ struct __packed toc0_sigSequence {
+ toc0_small_seq tag_algorithm;
+ toc0_large_bit tag_signature;
+ uint8_t signature[256];
+ } sigSequence;
+ } totalSequence;
+};
+
+#define sizeof_field(TYPE, MEMBER) sizeof((((TYPE *)0)->MEMBER))
+
+static const struct toc0_cert_item cert_item_template = {
+ TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_totalSequence)),
+ {
+ TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_mainSequence)),
+ {
+ TOC0_SMALL_EXP(0, sizeof(struct toc0_explicit0)),
+ {
+ TOC0_SMALL_INT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_explicit0, version)),
+ 0,
+ },
+ TOC0_SMALL_INT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_mainSequence, serialNumber)),
+ 0,
+ TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0),
+ TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0),
+ TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0),
+ TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0),
+ TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_subjectPublicKeyInfo)),
+ {
+ TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0),
+ TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_publicKey)),
+ {
+ TOC0_LARGE_INT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_publicKey, n)),
+ {},
+ TOC0_SMALL_INT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_publicKey, e)),
+ {},
+ },
+ },
+ TOC0_SMALL_EXP(3, sizeof(struct toc0_explicit3)),
+ {
+ TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_extension)),
+ {
+ TOC0_SMALL_INT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_extension, digest)),
+ {},
+ },
+ },
+ },
+ TOC0_LARGE_BIT(sizeof(struct toc0_sigSequence)),
+ {
+ TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0),
+ TOC0_LARGE_BIT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_sigSequence, signature)),
+ {},
+ },
+ },
+};
+
+#define TOC0_DEFAULT_NUM_ITEMS 3
+#define TOC0_DEFAULT_HEADER_LEN \
+ ALIGN( \
+ sizeof(struct toc0_main_info) + \
+ sizeof(struct toc0_item_info) * TOC0_DEFAULT_NUM_ITEMS + \
+ sizeof(struct toc0_cert_item) + \
+ sizeof(struct toc0_key_item), \
+ 32)
+
+static char *fw_key_file = "fw_key.pem";
+static char *key_item_file = "key_item.bin";
+static char *root_key_file = "root_key.pem";
+
+/*
+ * Create a key item in @buf, containing the public keys @root_key and @fw_key,
+ * and signed by the RSA key @root_key.
+ */
+static int toc0_create_key_item(uint8_t *buf, uint32_t *len,
+ RSA *root_key, RSA *fw_key)
+{
+ struct toc0_key_item *key_item = (void *)buf;
+ uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ int ret = EXIT_FAILURE;
+ unsigned int sig_len;
+ int n_len, e_len;
+
+ /* Store key 0. */
+ n_len = BN_bn2bin(RSA_get0_n(root_key), key_item->key0);
+ e_len = BN_bn2bin(RSA_get0_e(root_key), key_item->key0 + n_len);
+ if (n_len + e_len > sizeof(key_item->key0)) {
+ pr_err("Root key is too big for key item\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ key_item->key0_n_len = cpu_to_le32(n_len);
+ key_item->key0_e_len = cpu_to_le32(e_len);
+
+ /* Store key 1. */
+ n_len = BN_bn2bin(RSA_get0_n(fw_key), key_item->key1);
+ e_len = BN_bn2bin(RSA_get0_e(fw_key), key_item->key1 + n_len);
+ if (n_len + e_len > sizeof(key_item->key1)) {
+ pr_err("Firmware key is too big for key item\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ key_item->key1_n_len = cpu_to_le32(n_len);
+ key_item->key1_e_len = cpu_to_le32(e_len);
+
+ /* Sign the key item. */
+ key_item->sig_len = cpu_to_le32(RSA_size(root_key));
+ SHA256(buf, key_item->sig - buf, digest);
+ if (!RSA_sign(NID_sha256, digest, sizeof(digest),
+ key_item->sig, &sig_len, root_key)) {
+ pr_err("Failed to sign key item\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (sig_len != sizeof(key_item->sig)) {
+ pr_err("Bad key item signature length\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ *len = sizeof(*key_item);
+ ret = EXIT_SUCCESS;
+
+err:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the key item in @buf, containing two public keys @key0 and @key1,
+ * and signed by the RSA key @key0. If @root_key is provided, only signatures
+ * by that key will be accepted. @key1 is returned in @key.
+ */
+static int toc0_verify_key_item(const uint8_t *buf, uint32_t len,
+ RSA *root_key, RSA **fw_key)
+{
+ struct toc0_key_item *key_item = (void *)buf;
+ uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ int ret = EXIT_FAILURE;
+ int n_len, e_len;
+ RSA *key0 = NULL;
+ RSA *key1 = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *n, *e;
+
+ if (len < sizeof(*key_item))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Load key 0. */
+ n_len = le32_to_cpu(key_item->key0_n_len);
+ e_len = le32_to_cpu(key_item->key0_e_len);
+ if (n_len + e_len > sizeof(key_item->key0)) {
+ pr_err("Bad root key size in key item\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ n = BN_bin2bn(key_item->key0, n_len, NULL);
+ e = BN_bin2bn(key_item->key0 + n_len, e_len, NULL);
+ key0 = RSA_new();
+ if (!key0)
+ goto err;
+ if (!RSA_set0_key(key0, n, e, NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* If a root key was provided, compare it to key 0. */
+ if (root_key && (BN_cmp(n, RSA_get0_n(root_key)) ||
+ BN_cmp(e, RSA_get0_e(root_key)))) {
+ pr_err("Wrong root key in key item\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Verify the key item signature. */
+ SHA256(buf, key_item->sig - buf, digest);
+ if (!RSA_verify(NID_sha256, digest, sizeof(digest),
+ key_item->sig, le32_to_cpu(key_item->sig_len), key0)) {
+ pr_err("Bad key item signature\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (fw_key) {
+ /* Load key 1. */
+ n_len = le32_to_cpu(key_item->key1_n_len);
+ e_len = le32_to_cpu(key_item->key1_e_len);
+ if (n_len + e_len > sizeof(key_item->key1)) {
+ pr_err("Bad firmware key size in key item\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ n = BN_bin2bn(key_item->key1, n_len, NULL);
+ e = BN_bin2bn(key_item->key1 + n_len, e_len, NULL);
+ key1 = RSA_new();
+ if (!key1)
+ goto err;
+ if (!RSA_set0_key(key1, n, e, NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (*fw_key) {
+ /* If a FW key was provided, compare it to key 1. */
+ if (BN_cmp(n, RSA_get0_n(*fw_key)) ||
+ BN_cmp(e, RSA_get0_e(*fw_key))) {
+ pr_err("Wrong firmware key in key item\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Otherwise, send key1 back to the caller. */
+ *fw_key = key1;
+ key1 = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = EXIT_SUCCESS;
+
+err:
+ RSA_free(key0);
+ RSA_free(key1);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a certificate in @buf, describing the firmware with SHA256 digest
+ * @digest, and signed by the RSA key @fw_key.
+ */
+static int toc0_create_cert_item(uint8_t *buf, uint32_t *len, RSA *fw_key,
+ uint8_t digest[static SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH])
+{
+ struct toc0_cert_item *cert_item = (void *)buf;
+ uint8_t cert_digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ struct toc0_totalSequence *totalSequence;
+ struct toc0_sigSequence *sigSequence;
+ struct toc0_extension *extension;
+ struct toc0_publicKey *publicKey;
+ int ret = EXIT_FAILURE;
+ unsigned int sig_len;
+
+ memcpy(cert_item, &cert_item_template, sizeof(*cert_item));
+ *len = sizeof(*cert_item);
+
+ /*
+ * Fill in the public key.
+ *
+ * Only 2048-bit RSA keys are supported. Since this uses a fixed-size
+ * structure, it may fail for non-standard exponents.
+ */
+ totalSequence = &cert_item->totalSequence;
+ publicKey = &totalSequence->mainSequence.subjectPublicKeyInfo.publicKey;
+ if (BN_bn2binpad(RSA_get0_n(fw_key), publicKey->n, sizeof(publicKey->n)) < 0 ||
+ BN_bn2binpad(RSA_get0_e(fw_key), publicKey->e, sizeof(publicKey->e)) < 0) {
+ pr_err("Firmware key is too big for certificate\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Fill in the firmware digest. */
+ extension = &totalSequence->mainSequence.explicit3.extension;
+ memcpy(&extension->digest, digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+
+ /*
+ * Sign the certificate.
+ *
+ * In older SBROM versions (and by default in newer versions),
+ * the last 4 bytes of the certificate are not signed.
+ *
+ * (The buffer passed to SHA256 starts at tag_mainSequence, but
+ * the buffer size does not include the length of that tag.)
+ */
+ SHA256((uint8_t *)totalSequence, sizeof(struct toc0_mainSequence), cert_digest);
+ sigSequence = &totalSequence->sigSequence;
+ if (!RSA_sign(NID_sha256, cert_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ sigSequence->signature, &sig_len, fw_key)) {
+ pr_err("Failed to sign certificate\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (sig_len != sizeof(sigSequence->signature)) {
+ pr_err("Bad certificate signature length\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = EXIT_SUCCESS;
+
+err:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the certificate in @buf, describing the firmware with SHA256 digest
+ * @digest, and signed by the RSA key contained within. If @fw_key is provided,
+ * only that key will be accepted.
+ *
+ * This function is only expected to work with images created by mkimage.
+ */
+static int toc0_verify_cert_item(const uint8_t *buf, uint32_t len, RSA *fw_key,
+ uint8_t digest[static SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH])
+{
+ const struct toc0_cert_item *cert_item = (const void *)buf;
+ uint8_t cert_digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ const struct toc0_totalSequence *totalSequence;
+ const struct toc0_sigSequence *sigSequence;
+ const struct toc0_extension *extension;
+ const struct toc0_publicKey *publicKey;
+ int ret = EXIT_FAILURE;
+ RSA *key = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *n, *e;
+
+ /* Extract the public key from the certificate. */
+ totalSequence = &cert_item->totalSequence;
+ publicKey = &totalSequence->mainSequence.subjectPublicKeyInfo.publicKey;
+ n = BN_bin2bn(publicKey->n, sizeof(publicKey->n), NULL);
+ e = BN_bin2bn(publicKey->e, sizeof(publicKey->e), NULL);
+ key = RSA_new();
+ if (!key)
+ goto err;
+ if (!RSA_set0_key(key, n, e, NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* If a key was provided, compare it to the embedded key. */
+ if (fw_key && (BN_cmp(RSA_get0_n(key), RSA_get0_n(fw_key)) ||
+ BN_cmp(RSA_get0_e(key), RSA_get0_e(fw_key)))) {
+ pr_err("Wrong firmware key in certificate\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* If a digest was provided, compare it to the embedded digest. */
+ extension = &totalSequence->mainSequence.explicit3.extension;
+ if (digest && memcmp(&extension->digest, digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
+ pr_err("Wrong firmware digest in certificate\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Verify the certificate's signature. See the comment above. */
+ SHA256((uint8_t *)totalSequence, sizeof(struct toc0_mainSequence), cert_digest);
+ sigSequence = &totalSequence->sigSequence;
+ if (!RSA_verify(NID_sha256, cert_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ sigSequence->signature,
+ sizeof(sigSequence->signature), key)) {
+ pr_err("Bad certificate signature\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = EXIT_SUCCESS;
+
+err:
+ RSA_free(key);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Always create a TOC0 containing 3 items. The extra item will be ignored on
+ * SoCs which do not support it.
+ */
+static int toc0_create(uint8_t *buf, uint32_t len, RSA *root_key, RSA *fw_key,
+ uint8_t *key_item, uint32_t key_item_len,
+ uint8_t *fw_item, uint32_t fw_item_len, uint32_t fw_addr)
+{
+ struct toc0_main_info *main_info = (void *)buf;
+ struct toc0_item_info *item_info = (void *)(main_info + 1);
+ uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ uint32_t *buf32 = (void *)buf;
+ RSA *orig_fw_key = fw_key;
+ int ret = EXIT_FAILURE;
+ uint32_t checksum = 0;
+ uint32_t item_offset;
+ uint32_t item_length;
+ int i;
+
+ /* Hash the firmware for inclusion in the certificate. */
+ SHA256(fw_item, fw_item_len, digest);
+
+ /* Create the main TOC0 header, containing three items. */
+ memcpy(main_info->name, TOC0_MAIN_INFO_NAME, sizeof(main_info->name));
+ main_info->magic = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_MAIN_INFO_MAGIC);
+ main_info->checksum = cpu_to_le32(BROM_STAMP_VALUE);
+ main_info->num_items = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_DEFAULT_NUM_ITEMS);
+ memcpy(main_info->end, TOC0_MAIN_INFO_END, sizeof(main_info->end));
+
+ /* The first item links the ROTPK to the signing key. */
+ item_offset = sizeof(*main_info) +
+ sizeof(*item_info) * TOC0_DEFAULT_NUM_ITEMS;
+ /* Using an existing key item avoids needing the root private key. */
+ if (key_item) {
+ item_length = sizeof(*key_item);
+ if (toc0_verify_key_item(key_item, item_length,
+ root_key, &fw_key))
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(buf + item_offset, key_item, item_length);
+ } else if (toc0_create_key_item(buf + item_offset, &item_length,
+ root_key, fw_key)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ item_info->name = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_KEY);
+ item_info->offset = cpu_to_le32(item_offset);
+ item_info->length = cpu_to_le32(item_length);
+ memcpy(item_info->end, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_END, sizeof(item_info->end));
+
+ /* The second item contains a certificate signed by the firmware key. */
+ item_offset = item_offset + item_length;
+ if (toc0_create_cert_item(buf + item_offset, &item_length,
+ fw_key, digest))
+ goto err;
+
+ item_info++;
+ item_info->name = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_CERT);
+ item_info->offset = cpu_to_le32(item_offset);
+ item_info->length = cpu_to_le32(item_length);
+ memcpy(item_info->end, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_END, sizeof(item_info->end));
+
+ /* The third item contains the actual boot code. */
+ item_offset = ALIGN(item_offset + item_length, 32);
+ item_length = fw_item_len;
+ if (buf + item_offset != fw_item)
+ memmove(buf + item_offset, fw_item, item_length);
+
+ item_info++;
+ item_info->name = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_FIRMWARE);
+ item_info->offset = cpu_to_le32(item_offset);
+ item_info->length = cpu_to_le32(item_length);
+ item_info->load_addr = cpu_to_le32(fw_addr);
+ memcpy(item_info->end, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_END, sizeof(item_info->end));
+
+ /* Pad to the required block size with 0xff to be flash-friendly. */
+ item_offset = item_offset + item_length;
+ item_length = ALIGN(item_offset, PAD_SIZE) - item_offset;
+ memset(buf + item_offset, 0xff, item_length);
+
+ /* Fill in the total padded file length. */
+ item_offset = item_offset + item_length;
+ main_info->length = cpu_to_le32(item_offset);
+
+ /* Verify enough space was provided when creating the image. */
+ assert(len >= item_offset);
+
+ /* Calculate the checksum. Yes, it's that simple. */
+ for (i = 0; i < item_offset / 4; ++i)
+ checksum += le32_to_cpu(buf32[i]);
+ main_info->checksum = cpu_to_le32(checksum);
+
+ ret = EXIT_SUCCESS;
+
+err:
+ if (fw_key != orig_fw_key)
+ RSA_free(fw_key);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct toc0_item_info *
+toc0_find_item(const struct toc0_main_info *main_info, uint32_t name,
+ uint32_t *offset, uint32_t *length)
+{
+ const struct toc0_item_info *item_info = (void *)(main_info + 1);
+ uint32_t item_offset, item_length;
+ uint32_t num_items, main_length;
+ int i;
+
+ num_items = le32_to_cpu(main_info->num_items);
+ main_length = le32_to_cpu(main_info->length);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_items; ++i, ++item_info) {
+ if (le32_to_cpu(item_info->name) != name)
+ continue;
+
+ item_offset = le32_to_cpu(item_info->offset);
+ item_length = le32_to_cpu(item_info->length);
+
+ if (item_offset > main_length ||
+ item_length > main_length - item_offset)
+ continue;
+
+ *offset = item_offset;
+ *length = item_length;
+
+ return item_info;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int toc0_verify(const uint8_t *buf, uint32_t len, RSA *root_key)
+{
+ const struct toc0_main_info *main_info = (void *)buf;
+ const struct toc0_item_info *item_info;
+ uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ uint32_t main_length = le32_to_cpu(main_info->length);
+ uint32_t checksum = BROM_STAMP_VALUE;
+ uint32_t *buf32 = (void *)buf;
+ uint32_t length, offset;
+ int ret = EXIT_FAILURE;
+ RSA *fw_key = NULL;
+ int i;
+
+ if (len < main_length)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Verify the main header. */
+ if (memcmp(main_info->name, TOC0_MAIN_INFO_NAME, sizeof(main_info->name)))
+ goto err;
+ if (le32_to_cpu(main_info->magic) != TOC0_MAIN_INFO_MAGIC)
+ goto err;
+ /* Verify the checksum without modifying the buffer. */
+ for (i = 0; i < main_length / 4; ++i)
+ checksum += le32_to_cpu(buf32[i]);
+ if (checksum != 2 * le32_to_cpu(main_info->checksum))
+ goto err;
+ /* The length must be at least 512 byte aligned. */
+ if (main_length % 512)
+ goto err;
+ if (memcmp(main_info->end, TOC0_MAIN_INFO_END, sizeof(main_info->end)))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Verify the key item if present (it is optional). */
+ item_info = toc0_find_item(main_info, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_KEY,
+ &offset, &length);
+ if (!item_info)
+ fw_key = root_key;
+ else if (toc0_verify_key_item(buf + offset, length, root_key, &fw_key))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Hash the firmware to compare with the certificate. */
+ item_info = toc0_find_item(main_info, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_FIRMWARE,
+ &offset, &length);
+ if (!item_info) {
+ pr_err("Missing firmware item\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ SHA256(buf + offset, length, digest);
+
+ /* Verify the certificate item. */
+ item_info = toc0_find_item(main_info, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_CERT,
+ &offset, &length);
+ if (!item_info) {
+ pr_err("Missing certificate item\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (toc0_verify_cert_item(buf + offset, length, fw_key, digest))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = EXIT_SUCCESS;
+
+err:
+ if (fw_key != root_key)
+ RSA_free(fw_key);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int toc0_check_params(struct image_tool_params *params)
+{
+ if (!params->dflag)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * If a key directory was provided, look for key files there.
+ * Otherwise, look for them in the current directory. The key files are
+ * the "quoted" terms in the description below.
+ *
+ * A summary of the chain of trust on most SoCs:
+ * 1) eFuse contains a SHA256 digest of the public "root key".
+ * 2) Private "root key" signs the certificate item (generated here).
+ * 3) Certificate item contains a SHA256 digest of the firmware item.
+ *
+ * A summary of the chain of trust on the H6 (by default; a bit in the
+ * BROM_CONFIG eFuse makes it work like above):
+ * 1) eFuse contains a SHA256 digest of the public "root key".
+ * 2) Private "root key" signs the "key item" (generated here).
+ * 3) "Key item" contains the public "root key" and public "fw key".
+ * 4) Private "fw key" signs the certificate item (generated here).
+ * 5) Certificate item contains a SHA256 digest of the firmware item.
+ *
+ * This means there are three valid ways to generate a TOC0:
+ * 1) Provide the private "root key" only. This works everywhere.
+ * For H6, the "root key" will also be used as the "fw key".
+ * 2) FOR H6 ONLY: Provide the private "root key" and a separate
+ * private "fw key".
+ * 3) FOR H6 ONLY: Provide the private "fw key" and a pre-existing
+ * "key item" containing the corresponding public "fw key".
+ * In this case, the private "root key" can be kept offline. The
+ * "key item" can be extracted from a TOC0 image generated using
+ * method #2 above.
+ *
+ * Note that until the ROTPK_HASH eFuse is programmed, any "root key"
+ * will be accepted by the BROM.
+ */
+ if (params->keydir) {
+ if (asprintf(&fw_key_file, "%s/%s", params->keydir, fw_key_file) < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (asprintf(&key_item_file, "%s/%s", params->keydir, key_item_file) < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (asprintf(&root_key_file, "%s/%s", params->keydir, root_key_file) < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int toc0_verify_header(unsigned char *buf, int image_size,
+ struct image_tool_params *params)
+{
+ int ret = EXIT_FAILURE;
+ RSA *root_key = NULL;
+ FILE *fp;
+
+ /* A root public key is optional. */
+ fp = fopen(root_key_file, "rb");
+ if (fp) {
+ pr_info("Verifying image with existing root key\n");
+ root_key = PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (!root_key)
+ root_key = PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ fclose(fp);
+ if (!root_key) {
+ pr_err("Failed to read public key from '%s'\n",
+ root_key_file);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = toc0_verify(buf, image_size, root_key);
+
+err:
+ RSA_free(root_key);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static const char *toc0_item_name(uint32_t name)
+{
+ if (name == TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_CERT)
+ return "Certificate";
+ if (name == TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_FIRMWARE)
+ return "Firmware";
+ if (name == TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_KEY)
+ return "Key";
+ return "(unknown)";
+}
+
+static void toc0_print_header(const void *buf)
+{
+ const struct toc0_main_info *main_info = buf;
+ const struct toc0_item_info *item_info = (void *)(main_info + 1);
+ uint32_t head_length, main_length, num_items;
+ uint32_t item_offset, item_length, item_name;
+ int load_addr = -1;
+ int i;
+
+ num_items = le32_to_cpu(main_info->num_items);
+ head_length = sizeof(*main_info) + num_items * sizeof(*item_info);
+ main_length = le32_to_cpu(main_info->length);
+
+ printf("Allwinner TOC0 Image\n"
+ "Size: %d bytes\n"
+ "Contents: %d items\n"
+ " 00000000:%08x Headers\n",
+ main_length, num_items, head_length);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_items; ++i, ++item_info) {
+ item_offset = le32_to_cpu(item_info->offset);
+ item_length = le32_to_cpu(item_info->length);
+ item_name = le32_to_cpu(item_info->name);
+
+ if (item_name == TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_FIRMWARE)
+ load_addr = le32_to_cpu(item_info->load_addr);
+
+ printf(" %08x:%08x %s\n",
+ item_offset, item_length,
+ toc0_item_name(item_name));
+ }
+
+ if (num_items && item_offset + item_length < main_length) {
+ item_offset = item_offset + item_length;
+ item_length = main_length - item_offset;
+
+ printf(" %08x:%08x Padding\n",
+ item_offset, item_length);
+ }
+
+ if (load_addr != -1)
+ printf("Load address: 0x%08x\n", load_addr);
+}
+
+static void toc0_set_header(void *buf, struct stat *sbuf, int ifd,
+ struct image_tool_params *params)
+{
+ uint32_t key_item_len = 0;
+ uint8_t *key_item = NULL;
+ int ret = EXIT_FAILURE;
+ RSA *root_key = NULL;
+ RSA *fw_key = NULL;
+ FILE *fp;
+
+ /* Either a key item or the root private key is required. */
+ fp = fopen(key_item_file, "rb");
+ if (fp) {
+ pr_info("Creating image using existing key item\n");
+ key_item_len = sizeof(struct toc0_key_item);
+ key_item = OPENSSL_malloc(key_item_len);
+ if (!key_item || fread(key_item, key_item_len, 1, fp) != 1) {
+ pr_err("Failed to read key item from '%s'\n",
+ root_key_file);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ fclose(fp);
+ fp = NULL;
+ }
+
+ fp = fopen(root_key_file, "rb");
+ if (fp) {
+ root_key = PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (!root_key)
+ root_key = PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ fclose(fp);
+ fp = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* When using an existing key item, the root key is optional. */
+ if (!key_item && (!root_key || !RSA_get0_d(root_key))) {
+ pr_err("Failed to read private key from '%s'\n",
+ root_key_file);
+ pr_info("Try 'openssl genrsa -out root_key.pem'\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* The certificate/firmware private key is always required. */
+ fp = fopen(fw_key_file, "rb");
+ if (fp) {
+ fw_key = PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ fclose(fp);
+ fp = NULL;
+ }
+ if (!fw_key) {
+ /* If the root key is a private key, it can be used instead. */
+ if (root_key && RSA_get0_d(root_key)) {
+ pr_info("Using root key as firmware key\n");
+ fw_key = root_key;
+ } else {
+ pr_err("Failed to read private key from '%s'\n",
+ fw_key_file);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Warn about potential compatibility issues. */
+ if (key_item || fw_key != root_key)
+ pr_warn("Only H6 supports separate root and firmware keys\n");
+
+ ret = toc0_create(buf, params->file_size, root_key, fw_key,
+ key_item, key_item_len,
+ buf + TOC0_DEFAULT_HEADER_LEN,
+ params->orig_file_size, params->addr);
+
+err:
+ OPENSSL_free(key_item);
+ OPENSSL_free(root_key);
+ if (fw_key != root_key)
+ OPENSSL_free(fw_key);
+ if (fp)
+ fclose(fp);
+
+ if (ret != EXIT_SUCCESS)
+ exit(ret);
+}
+
+static int toc0_check_image_type(uint8_t type)
+{
+ return type == IH_TYPE_SUNXI_TOC0 ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+static int toc0_vrec_header(struct image_tool_params *params,
+ struct image_type_params *tparams)
+{
+ tparams->hdr = calloc(tparams->header_size, 1);
+
+ /* Save off the unpadded data size for SHA256 calculation. */
+ params->orig_file_size = params->file_size - TOC0_DEFAULT_HEADER_LEN;
+
+ /* Return padding to 8K blocks. */
+ return ALIGN(params->file_size, PAD_SIZE) - params->file_size;
+}
+
+U_BOOT_IMAGE_TYPE(
+ sunxi_toc0,
+ "Allwinner TOC0 Boot Image support",
+ TOC0_DEFAULT_HEADER_LEN,
+ NULL,
+ toc0_check_params,
+ toc0_verify_header,
+ toc0_print_header,
+ toc0_set_header,
+ NULL,
+ toc0_check_image_type,
+ NULL,
+ toc0_vrec_header
+);
--
2.33.1
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