[U-Boot] [PATCH v2 4/7] arm: mach-k3: Add secure device support
Andrew F. Davis
afd at ti.com
Thu Feb 21 22:35:09 UTC 2019
K3 devices have High Security (HS) variants along with the non-HS already
supported. Like the previous generation devices (OMAP/Keystone2) K3
supports boot chain-of-trust by authenticating and optionally decrypting
images as they are unpacked from FIT images. Add support for this here.
Signed-off-by: Andrew F. Davis <afd at ti.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Rini <trini at konsulko.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dannenberg <dannenberg at ti.com>
---
MAINTAINERS | 1 +
arch/arm/Kconfig | 2 +-
arch/arm/mach-k3/Makefile | 1 +
arch/arm/mach-k3/security.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 arch/arm/mach-k3/security.c
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index f1f8818d6b..5dd69562e0 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -716,6 +716,7 @@ S: Supported
F: arch/arm/mach-omap2/omap5/sec_entry_cpu1.S
F: arch/arm/mach-omap2/sec-common.c
F: arch/arm/mach-omap2/config_secure.mk
+F: arch/arm/mach-k3/security.c
F: configs/am335x_hs_evm_defconfig
F: configs/am335x_hs_evm_uart_defconfig
F: configs/am43xx_hs_evm_defconfig
diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig
index 455f06cfee..da397097e5 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig
@@ -1417,7 +1417,7 @@ endchoice
config TI_SECURE_DEVICE
bool "HS Device Type Support"
- depends on ARCH_KEYSTONE || ARCH_OMAP2PLUS
+ depends on ARCH_KEYSTONE || ARCH_OMAP2PLUS || ARCH_K3
help
If a high secure (HS) device type is being used, this config
must be set. This option impacts various aspects of the
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-k3/Makefile b/arch/arm/mach-k3/Makefile
index bd4ab361b2..0c3a4f7db1 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mach-k3/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-k3/Makefile
@@ -6,4 +6,5 @@
obj-$(CONFIG_SOC_K3_AM6) += am6_init.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ARM64) += arm64-mmu.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_V7R) += r5_mpu.o lowlevel_init.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_TI_SECURE_DEVICE) += security.o
obj-y += common.o
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-k3/security.c b/arch/arm/mach-k3/security.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..52f49bf01f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-k3/security.c
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * K3: Security functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 Texas Instruments Incorporated - http://www.ti.com/
+ * Andrew F. Davis <afd at ti.com>
+ */
+
+#include <common.h>
+#include <dm.h>
+#include <linux/soc/ti/ti_sci_protocol.h>
+#include <mach/spl.h>
+#include <spl.h>
+
+void board_fit_image_post_process(void **p_image, size_t *p_size)
+{
+ struct udevice *dev;
+ struct ti_sci_handle *ti_sci;
+ struct ti_sci_proc_ops *proc_ops;
+ u64 image_addr;
+ u32 image_size;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Get handle to Device Management and Security Controller (SYSFW) */
+ ret = uclass_get_device_by_name(UCLASS_FIRMWARE, "dmsc", &dev);
+ if (ret) {
+ printf("Failed to get handle to SYSFW (%d)\n", ret);
+ hang();
+ }
+ ti_sci = (struct ti_sci_handle *)(ti_sci_get_handle_from_sysfw(dev));
+ proc_ops = &ti_sci->ops.proc_ops;
+
+ image_addr = (uintptr_t)*p_image;
+
+ debug("Authenticating image at address 0x%016llx\n", image_addr);
+
+ /* Authenticate image */
+ ret = proc_ops->proc_auth_boot_image(ti_sci, &image_addr, &image_size);
+ if (ret) {
+ printf("Authentication failed!\n");
+ hang();
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The image_size returned may be 0 when the authentication process has
+ * moved the image. When this happens no further processing on the
+ * image is needed or often even possible as it may have also been
+ * placed behind a firewall when moved.
+ */
+ *p_size = image_size;
+
+ /*
+ * Output notification of successful authentication to re-assure the
+ * user that the secure code is being processed as expected. However
+ * suppress any such log output in case of building for SPL and booting
+ * via YMODEM. This is done to avoid disturbing the YMODEM serial
+ * protocol transactions.
+ */
+ if (!(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPL_BUILD) &&
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPL_YMODEM_SUPPORT) &&
+ spl_boot_device() == BOOT_DEVICE_UART))
+ printf("Authentication passed\n");
+}
--
2.19.1
More information about the U-Boot
mailing list