[PATCH v3] spl: allow board_spl_fit_post_load() to fail

[Tom Rini]

On Mon, Jun 01, 2020 at 12:08:45PM +0200, Marek Vasut wrote:
> On 6/1/20 4:30 AM, Peng Fan wrote:
> >> Subject: [PATCH v3] spl: allow board_spl_fit_post_load() to fail
> >>
> >> On i.MX platforms board_spl_fit_post_load() can check the loaded SPL image
> >> for authenticity using its HAB engine.  U-Boot's SPL mechanism allows
> >> booting images from other sources as well, but in the current setup the SPL
> >> would just hang if it encounters an image that does not pass scrutiny.
> > 
> > security.
> > 
> >> Allowing the function to return an error, allows the SPL to try booting from
> >> another source as a fallback instead of ending up as a brick.
> > 
> > This will break secure boot chain.
> 
> How? Please elaborate.
> 
> jump_to_image_no_args() will authenticate the image before starting it,
> so I don't think so. However, that is still prone to
> time-of-check/time-of-use attack anyway.

Yes, please elaborate, thanks!

-- 
Tom
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